Gran Torino: Social and Security Implications of the XX Winter Olympic Games

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This paper examines issues relating to the security of the XX Winter Olympic Games, which took place in Turin, Italy, from the 10th to the 26th of February 2006. In doing so it explores three crucial aspects of those Games, first, the general social context, second forms of resistance directed against the Winter Games and third the Integrated Security System (ISS) which was developed for and implemented at the sporting venues. This included installing a number of surveillance technologies that sought to address distinctive security concerns. Our aim is to emphasize not only the trend towards the securitization of mega-events at a national and international level, but to also understand some of the broader social implications of the Olympics. In the process, our work also contributes to the literature on the XX Winter Games which to date has tended to be quite thin and fragmented (Bondonio and Campaniello 2006a; Bertone and Degiorgis 2006).

We have chosen to emphasize these factors because of some of the unique peculiarities of the XX Winter Olympics. One of the most important of these concerns the smaller scale of the Turin Games, which translated into a series of security measures that contrast with the typical overzealous security planning for mega events. So, this smaller scale meant that the security dynamics, surveillance practices and legacies tended to be more limited than the types of intensive security systems implemented in Athens (Samatas 2008) or Beijing (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 266). That said, while security in Turin was neither exceptional nor “spectacular” (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), it did result in a process of Olympic-motivated urban regeneration (Hiller 2000) that included implementing new surveillance measures. While this could not be characterized as the construction of “defensive urban landscapes” (Coaffee 2003: 6), it still entailed a series
of interesting dynamics and proved to be a catalyst to make the city more competitive at a national and international level. These were also planned and implemented in such a way that they generated social conflict in the local mountain communities who resented not being consulted on such matters (della Porta 2008).

Both local and global dynamics shaped the security apparatus for these Games in important ways. At the global level, the XX Winter Olympic were held only seven months after the 7 July 2005 bombing in London. While security planning for the Olympics was in place before July 2005, the London bombings had a key impact on new national legislation, and more generally on security and risk perception shortly before the Games. The attack influenced the dynamics of national crisis management and security measures and led to the introduction of new anti-terrorists laws.

Security planners also had to deal with a host of local protests and demonstrations. Indeed, unlike other mega events where fears of international terrorism dominate, the situation in Turin was unique, in part, because of how specific local sociopolitical concerns, more than global threats, dominated the overall approach to security. Specifically, security planners were anxious about the prospect that local protests and demonstrations would disrupt the Games. The existence of such issues prompted Johnson to argue that notwithstanding the comparatively small scale of these Games, organizers faced “a local and international picture of potential threats that was every bit as complex as those that faced their predecessors in Sydney, Salt Lake City and Athens” (Johnson 2008: 6).
Thus, the XX Winter Games, reproduce a series of global processes and local dynamics which also reveal local and national attitudes towards a top down approach to secure or “improve” physical environments that proceeded without input from local citizens. In such situations, where the needs of locals become secondary, tensions are likely to emerge (Degen 2004: 141), and this appears to have been the case in Turin.

**The Olympic theater**

The Olympic theater was divided into the metropolitan area of Turin and mountain area of Val di Susa and Val Chisone. In recent decades, Turin—the first capital of Italy (1861-1864)—has undergone a major transition from being a large industrial city known for being the home of FIAT to emerge as an extremely vital cultural center. This change of identity, due in part to a deindustrialization process, is well reflected in the city’s urban transformation (Bondonio and Campaniello 2006a). Given continuing aspirations of greater urban development it was no surprise that in 1998 the city chose to bid for the Winter Games. These Games were seen by city officials “as a unique opportunity to schedule and accelerate changes in line with the prospects defined by its Strategic Plan” (Bondonio and Campaniello 2006a: 4). This included a desire to integrate the metropolitan area into the international system, promote the image of the city and improve urban amenities. Many of these improvements had long been planned for but, as is so often the case, the Olympics were recognized as being a powerful catalyst for change, a chance to smooth the aforementioned urban transition and to present the city to the international community.
The political sensibilities of residents in the mountain areas, in particular that of Val di Susa, which connected the main venues, was of concern for the authorities both before and during the Olympics. The major issue here was the proposed high-speed train (TAV) project that was designed to align the operations of the Italian rail network to European rail standards, improve travel times both between Italian cities and some European rail networks and culminate in a high speed network across the entire country. Mountain communities saw this as a controversial development, and for residents of Val di Susa in particular, this was a longstanding issue, as they had commenced a fight against the construction of a new railway in response to a proposal in the late 90s to connect Turin to the French city of Lyon. Many opposed these initiatives due to anxieties about their overall environmental impact, including the fact that the high speed train would pass through mountains where asbestos and other dangerous substances would be released during construction.

Officials were anxious that demonstrations against the TAV would spill over into Olympic celebrations which could lead to potential conflicts between police and demonstrators. This anxiety is apparent from the fact that the Anti Terrorism section of the Division of General Investigations and Special Operations (Digos) characterized the pre-games protests by civil society groups against sponsors and in opposition to the proposed high speed train Treno Alta Velocità (TAV) as “noteworthy circumstances.” In December 2005 the Italian government delayed the start of construction to calm the environmental protests carried out in Val di Susa and Turin. The situation in the valley was in fact very tense. At that time clashes erupted at Venaus (Val di Susa) when police first attempted to clear a site occupied by protesters. This was one of the most acute
moments in the conflict between police and mountain communities, with the communities complaining about state aggression, injustices and an increased “militarization of the valley” (della Porta 2008: 19).

The operational dynamics of these transportation systems introduced some of the Games’ most significant lasting surveillance legacies as the “transportation improvement plan” involved a considerable use of surveillance technologies. The SI Pass, for instance, was a Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID) card that can be used to pay for public transport, among other things. The card, developed by a Norwegian company on behalf of the Italian transport operator SITAF, consisted of a double microchip with a double interface (contact and contact-less) utilizing tag and beacon technology. The SI card could be used to avoid using cash on motorway tolls and also enabled transportation users to electronically pay for public city transport (buses, trams and underground) and for using car parks. During the Winter Olympics, the card was also used to pay for ski-passes and could provide access to various events (European Technology Assessment Group 2007).

According to a study written by the Scientific Technology Options Assessment (STOA European Parliament 2007), the SI Pass, similar to the London Oyster Card, provided users with a certain level of identity management which allowed them to gain some control over the use of personal information. It also raised two main concerns, firstly, the users “[had] to do something for [identity management],” and secondly, “it [was] not clear what information [would] be collected besides data on the movement of vehicles” (2007: 61).
Moreover, in order to monitor the vehicle flow in the urban and the mountain areas, the Traffic Operation Centre (TOC) collected data from several devices including transport software (real-time planning, dynamic assignment, “supervisor” system, etc.), monitoring tools (sensors, indicators, and cameras) and centralized traffic lights system. The overall approach was to extend existing ITS systems to monitor traffic and collect information. The TOC organization was particularly complex and consisted of monitoring, collecting and sharing information among the local police, the road police and the motorway companies through an integrated system for traffic, transport management and control.

Contact-less technologies were also implemented in the Turin Metro (underground) with rigid contact-less card tickets containing embedded microchips for remote scanning. Even though the new underground system was not conceived specifically for the Games, it is likely that Turin would never have had such an advanced system without the funds allocated to the Olympic by the Italian Parliament. The Turin Metro contains 550 cameras with images displayed in real time on screen control room walls and stored for up to seven days. Of these 550 cameras, 184 are on board the trains while the remaining ones are in the stations. This video surveillance system had to be ready in time for the Olympics for public safety reasons. In addition, the integrated VAL (Automatic Light Vehicle) system which was used for the first time in Italy in the Metro, is another surveillance legacy of the Winter Olympics. It consists of automated driverless light vehicles fully equipped with surveillance cameras.
The Olympics also provided an opportunity for a 90 million euro renovation of the airport (Study Department of the Turin Chamber of Commerce, 2005. In January 2006, the restyled Turin Caselle Airport was inaugurated complete with improvements that included, amongst other things, a new baggage handling system (BHS) equipped with highly sophisticated x-ray control as well as a new terminal dedicated to charter passengers.

Overall, surveillance and security measures were implemented both to deal with new challenges posed by the Winter Olympic Games and to promote a new image of a city which, as noted above, was “in transition.” The aforementioned measures reduced the level of “surveillance free areas” in a city that at that time had considerably less surveillance technologies compared to Milan (Fonio 2005) or Rome. One major issue of concern, however, is that the Olympic legacies related to surveillance went far beyond the Games and received almost no media attention.

“No Olympics!”

The other key local group that was of concern to the authorities was the “Against Olympics Coordination” (now referred to as “No Olympics Committee” or “No Olympics!”). This group was founded in 1997 during the World Alpine Sky Championship held in Sestrière when the first rumors emerged that Turin would apply to the IOC to host the XX Olympic Winter Games. “No Olympics!” was formed from various civil society groups such the Askatasuna Community Center (Turin), organizations for the conservation of the environment (i.e. World Wildlife Fund) and
non-governmental organizations (i.e. Amnesty International). Paramount amongst the concerns of such groups was the detrimental environmental and economic impact of the Olympics. These groups saw the new infrastructure built in Val di Susa as a potential risk to an already damaged environment (Bertone and DeGiorgis 2006). They also saw these developments as a waste of public money (“public expense for private gain”) particularly given that, according to “No Olympics!,” it was unclear how the massive investments in infrastructure would be used in the future. The types of environmental concerns expressed by “No Olympics!” have subsequently been voiced at other Olympic Games, including by “No 2010 Olympics on Stolen Native Land,” a resistance network that opposed the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.

Although it would be misleading to suggest that the “NO TAV” group and the “No Olympics! Committee” were the same civil society group, the aims of their protests were, to a certain extent, similar. Residents of Val di Susa and supporters from many places often gathered together to prevent the TAV by occupying construction sites and demonstrating to try and block the Olympics. Moreover, solidarity and support for the mountain communities was part of the struggle against the Winter Games carried out by “No Olympics!” Peaceful demonstrations, occupations and actions built a strong sense of community in the valley and it is likely that they opened areas for other debates, such as those pertain to the environmental impact of numerous works (sporting venues, road infrastructures and villages for the athletes and press) for the Games.

Olympic sponsors also faced harsh criticisms that the Games were not-sustainable. Finmeccanica was a particular target of such concerns. Finmeccanica is a major Italian
industrial group operating in the aerospace, defense and security sectors and Elsag Datamat, one of its subsidiaries, designed and implemented the integrated security system at the winter games. The “No Olympics!” group claimed that the role played by Finmeccanica went against the ethical principles expressed by the TOROC in the Charter of Intents and broke the IOC prohibition on creating sponsorship relations with companies that produce weapons. Moreover, anti-Olympics protesters criticized the increased militarization of the event, which was apparent in the involvement of other official suppliers such as Garret Metal Detectors that, according to the committee, shipped several thousand security devices to Iraq.

As noted, part of the Italian protests surrounding the Olympics pertained to the costs of the event. The financial model chosen for Turin was a “mixed” one that involved private funding for organizational expenses (incurred by the TOROC) and a series of public investments (Bondiello and Campaniello 2006b). As the private funding was very limited, most of the funds ultimately came from the Italian government which was primarily responsible for financing the investments (constructing the venues, the building infrastructures and the planned road works). In the Sustainability Report (2006), TOROC estimated the overall games budget updated to October 2006 was 1,239 million Euros. Giulianotti and Klauser claim that the overall cost was US $1.4 billion (2010: 2). Bondonio and Campaniello (2006b) note that these expenditures made Turin 2006 an expensive event when compared to the previous eight editions of the Winter Olympics, as it was “more than 11 times more expensive than Lake Placid 1980 and more than 18 times more expensive than Sarajevo 1984” (2006: 11).
The major expenditure for the Games is officially identified as “technologies” (20%), although it is not apparent what exactly “technologies” means (X ray machines, surveillance cameras and so forth?). This makes it challenging to estimate the amount of the budget dedicated to security and surveillance devices. One of the security officials we spoke with argued that the Organizing Committee spent around 20-25 million Euros on security technologies (surveillance cameras, control rooms, X ray machines) at the venues. However, this cost does not include the surveillance system introduced to the public transportation system.

As shown, awarding the XX Winter Olympic Games to Turin was controversial in some circles, especially amongst the extreme left and established urban environmental movements. To promote their positions, those groups organized anti-Olympic protests and also illegally occupied public and private buildings which they used as base camps to coordinate activities designed to disrupt Olympic-related events. One high-profile target was the Olympic Torch relay through Italy, which these two groups used as an opportunity to publicize their grievances. Both the torchbearers and the sponsor’s logistical vehicles were targeted during the relay, which included assaults on officials and damage to vehicles. These incidents did, however, take place outside the Olympic venues and were efficiently contained by the Italian police forces. Nonetheless, they were widely reported in both the local and international media, creating a degree of publicity that made some sections of the Italian population uncomfortable about how they would be welcomed at the Games.
The protestor’s actions seem to have alienated broad segments of the Italian citizenry. The majority of the population and all the main political and sport-related leaders condemned their behaviour. These two groups ultimately abandoned any protests during the Olympic event in the light of public criticism, and also due to the increased security measures around the Olympic Venues. The paper now turns towards a description of some of these security measures, which were manifest in the Integrated Security System developed for the XX Olympic Games.

**The Integrated Security System (ISS)**

In advance of the Games, extensive security measures were established to deal with potential security threats. This included a new anti-terror law approved that August and the Olympic Decree of February 2006 which brought into force “urgent measures to guarantee security during the Winter Olympic Games.” As noted, this decree was conceived within the tense post 7/7 political climate when the terror alert level in Italy rose significantly. The “urgent measures” focused specifically on recruiting and hiring law enforcement personnel (“up to 1,115 police officers” and “50 fire units”), along with allocating special funding to develop anti-terrorist security in Piedmont’s airports. In December 2005, the Minister of Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu, addressed Parliament on new updated security measures. During his speech, he assured Parliament that law enforcement was developing a broad plan to address public security that consisted of a main Olympic security room linked to a national information centre that actively collaborated with intelligence services in various countries and 9,000 police officers. Ultimately, the venues and Olympic villages were staffed by a total of 14,184 personnel
(State Police, Carabinieri, Financial Police and State Forestry Corps) who deployed 465 metal detectors, 203 X-ray machines, 948 hand held metal detectors and 583 surveillance cameras.

Prior to the Games, officials ran through a series of security mock ups. This included two major counterterrorism exercises which took place in Milan, in Rome (September 2005) and in Turin (October 2005). One of the main factors they were testing was the operation of the “security ring” system, which became a key component in security operation during the Games. This approach divided each Olympic venue into different security areas, each of which had distinctive security characteristics and different access rules. A “venue” was a structure officially identified as one that would stage an activity of the XX Olympic Winter Games and that had to be managed and organized by TOROC. The Olympic venues included both permanent and temporary structures. The former were construction projects developed by various local governments as legacy project of the Olympic Games, while the latter were set up exclusively for the event as set out by the requirements of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for each Olympic-related activities.

The most external layer of security at an Olympic venue was referred to as the “Controlled Area,” and it consisted in a buffer zone between the actual venue and the surrounding territory. In this area Italian law enforcement personnel conducted random security checks on people, vehicles and goods. This area was situated in the public domain and included major roads, commercial activities and buildings. As such, it did
not limit access to people, goods and vehicles and was not delimited by a defined perimeter (e.g. fence).

The second security layer around the Olympic venues was the “Soft Ring,” characterized by a perimeter that consisted of different road blocks called “vehicle permit checkpoints” (VPCs). This perimeter demarcated a zone that was accessible only to authorized vehicles which had to display a specific pass—a Vehicle Access and/or Parking Permit (VAPP)—affixed to their windshield.

The most important component of the general security system developed for the XX Olympic Winter Games’ venues, however, was the creation of the “clean” Hard Ring area. This “Hard Ring” was the third and ultimate security cordon immediately surrounding the Olympic venues. It was physically delimited by a protective barrier and was, from a safety and security point of view, a clean/sterile space where all goods, people and vehicles were security screened before entering by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel. Moreover, there was an additional security area (the “security ring”) created specifically for the Olympic Villages of Turin and Sestrière. This security ring perimeter was characterized by a high fence and was located inside the above-mentioned Hard Ring perimeter.

The Hard Ring sought to keep the enclosed area clean (absent from prohibited or hazardous items) by security screening all goods, people and vehicles entering it. Here, the term “clean” refers to the status of a venue, but it could also be applied to a facility, person, vehicle, goods or material package which was known to be free from prohibited
and hazardous devices. Prohibited items were those objects, defined by Italian Law Enforcement Agencies, as being “intrinsically dangerous” and therefore prohibited within every Olympic venues’ perimeter. The prohibited items’ list included firearms, ammunition, explosives, chemical or incendiary devices and instruments commonly defined as weapons.

Keeping the Hard Ring area clean was accomplished by applying the Olympic venues’ access rules and involved two different operations: the venue “Lock Down” and the security sweep conducted by law enforcement. “Locking down” a venue was the first action to be taken in order to create a clean Hard Ring area. It was defined as being a state of security readiness and involved activating all the Integrated Security System (ISS) technologies, which we detail below.

Venue security sweeps were also designed to ensure that each Olympic venue was free from prohibited and hazardous items. They were conducted by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel utilizing special equipment (e.g. explosive detection dogs), in cooperation with TOROC staff, in all the Olympic venues in accordance with the schedule defined in the Olympic Venue Security Sweep Schedule (OVSSS).

The Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs) were positioned at the perimeter of the hard ring area where the security screening of vehicles took place. Those areas were at least 100 meters from the Olympic venues’ critical areas. At the VSAs the TOROC staff ensured that each vehicle entering the venue’s Hard Ring area had a valid VAPP and that the occupants of the vehicle had a valid accreditation. Italian Law Enforcement Agency
personnel ensured that each vehicle entering the venue’s Hard Ring area and its occupants were free from prohibited or hazardous items through a detailed security screen. The vehicles’ occupants were also screened through magnetic X-ray and physical bag searches ("Mag and Bag") situated at the VSAs.

Three levels of vehicle security screening were conducted at the VSAs and ranged from level 1 (full screening of vehicles) to level 3 (external screening). Those levels were determined by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel who assessed the information related to each vehicle. This included considerations pertaining to its origin (for example if the vehicle was arriving from another Olympic venue), if it deviated from the designated route, if it was escorted or if it was heading for the venues’ Hard Ring area. Again, such screening aimed to detect and deter the introduction of any prohibited or hazardous items (e.g. Improvised Explosive Device) into a venue’s Hand Ring.

“Mag and Bag” security screening was also situated on the perimeter of the venues’ Hard Ring area, where individuals could gain entry to the Olympic venues. To enter, spectators had to possess a valid ticket and staff had to have a valid accreditation. In addition, staff and spectators had to be security screened by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel. The security inspection consisted of screening people and their belongings (bags or hand carried items). This screening was done through a combination of technological (i.e. walk through magnetic metal detectors) and physical screening (tables for manual inspection of people’s bags). Moreover, different Olympic client groups (e.g. athletes, media, spectators, dignitaries) had to use specified “Mag
and Bag” points to enter the venues. The same security screening was conducted for each person entering the venue. The only people who were not searched in this way were international dignitaries, providing they were escorted by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel.

To implement the security policies and the procedures related to the Olympic venues’ access rules for people, vehicles and goods/materials, TOROC, in cooperation with Italian Law Enforcement Agencies, developed and implemented the Olympic Venues’ Integrated Security System (ISS), a combination of various security technologies and physical equipment at the venues’ Hard Ring perimeter.

The Integrated Security System was designed to assist security personnel (e.g. Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel and TOROC personnel) in implementing the Olympic venues’ “Hard Ring clean area” principle. The technologies/physical equipment utilized through the Olympic venues’ Integrated Security System (ISS), were put into practice with the Lock Down of the venues and consisted of the following:

- A 2.7 meter high security fence surrounding each venue in the “Hard Ring.”
- Illumination of the perimeter of each venue in the “Hard Ring” and additional critical areas (e.g. generators). Such illumination allowed the surveillance cameras and the anti-intrusion detection systems to function and patrollers to carry out their duties.
• Surveillance cameras—A surveillance system that transmitted digital images from fixed and domed cameras to the Venue Security Control Room (VSCR) located inside each Olympic venue. Here a TOROC operator monitored the images of the cameras. The fixed cameras were set up every 60 meters alongside the perimeter of the venues’ “Hard Ring” while the dome cameras were set up at strategic points (e.g. in the “Mags and Bags” areas).

• An Anti-Intrusion Detection System designed to detect any unauthorized entry into the Olympic venues’ “Hard Ring” from possible adversaries (e.g. a terrorist group). This system was managed by a trained TOROC operator in the Venue Security Control Room.

• A Venue Security Control Room (VSCR) which was the centre for the coordination and management of TOROC security operations in each Olympic venue. Located there was all of the monitoring equipment related to the surveillance cameras and the anti-intrusion detection systems. The Control Room was run by a senior TOROC staff member who managed the system through two-display videos. The left monitor showed the cartographic map of the venue and displayed all relevant graphic and textual information, such as the presence of surveillance cameras. The right video allowed the operator to visualize the camera’s video flows or to zoom in on a particular situation or object.

• Security patrolling of the Olympic venues’ “Hard Ring” perimeter and critical areas. These patrols were conducted by Italian Law Enforcement Agency personnel and TOROC staff. The critical areas which received particular attention consisted of all the operational areas (e.g. generators), the spectator seating areas/stands and the field of play in the competitive venues.
The Olympic venues’ security personnel and the C.N.I.O.

The three components of the general security system for the Olympic venues consisted of: 1) policies, procedures and contingency plans, 2) physical and technological equipment, and 3) personnel. Concerning the latter, a total of 9,278 people from Italian Law Enforcement Agencies worked at the Games. Before, during and after the Olympics, each of those individuals had to carry out specific duties informed by the documents that set-out the roles and responsibilities for each organization. TOROC, for example, among other responsibilities, was charged with implementing the security infrastructures of the Olympic venues, securing communication and transport systems, and managing ticket sales and marketing. The central and local law enforcement authorities of the Ministry of Interior were responsible for the event’s public safety, and for protecting the Olympic sites, villages venues, athletes, delegates and dignitaries.

The criteria adopted to work out a security plan drew on best practices and lessons learned from past events carried out both in Italy (i.e. Genoa 2008, Naples Global forum 2001) and in other countries, in particular in Japan/Korea (2001), Salt Lake City (2002), Greece (2004) and the 2004 UEFA Championships in Portugal. On the basis of such after-action reports the Ministry of Interior set up the CNIO (National Information Centre on Turin Winter Olympics) that had two main goals: intensify intelligence activity and improve international police cooperation. In particular the tasks of the CNIO before, during and after the event were, inter alia, the following:
Before the event: collect, analyze and exchange information at a national and international level and transmit information to the provincial Public Security Authorities; collect useful information involving all stakeholders (from the media to the sponsors).

During the event: manage information flow to assess potential threats.

After the event: produce a final report focused on security activities.

It is important to draw attention to the security activities that pertained to international police cooperation. If, at a national level, the flow of information involved several security departments (such as border police, intelligence services etc), at the international level the information flow involved a much wider network of intelligence services of participating countries, including Interpol, Europol and PWGOT (Police Working Group on Terrorism) and the CASA (Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee). As an example, the permanent contact point of the CNIO had to exchange information focused on risk analysis of potentially threatening people and groups expected to attend the Olympics. The technical surveillance used for gathering and processing intelligence included both the Olympic Control Room Tetra (Radio Communication System) and GIS (Geo Spatial Information System). Moreover, the Integraph Technology provided by the Italian Military Institute integrated feature data (collected, validated and integrated mapping data taken from multiple sources) to aid in the security operations during the Olympics.

All of these security measures appear to have successfully limited the opportunity for untoward eventualities. The XX Winter Olympic Games took place without any
relevant security incident and the security system implemented during the event by the various players (both law enforcement agencies and TOROC) were deemed to have been efficient and effective in delivering an incident-free event. Outside the Olympic venues and in the Olympic territory no incident related to the event took place. Only two bomb threats were recorded by the Italian police in the Olympic territory. These occurred outside the Olympic venues and were assessed as being nuisance alarms. Information retrieved from the Italian police (Questura di Torino) and from TOROC, suggest that no significant incident took place during Turin 2006 at the Olympic venues and in the broader Olympic territory. The registered security incidents that did occur inside the Olympic venues were confined to a group of protesters who tried to gain visibility during some Olympic competitions in order to unlawfully advertise a virtual casino called “Golden Palace.” They were unsuccessful and were arrested and questioned by the Italian police. Subsequently, an individual wearing a “Golden Palace” t-shirt, attempted to interrupt the speech of TOROC President Valentino Castellani during the closing ceremony at the Olympic Stadium. The individual was immediately blocked by the police and no significant disruption resulted. Perhaps the most notable criminal development was the theft of some ICT equipment from specific venues. These thefts occurred after the competitions and therefore when the venues were closed to the public. In the majority of cases the people responsible were arrested by the police and the equipment was retrieved.

Conclusions

The national literature focused on the XX Winter Games held in Turin in 2006 event is extremely limited. Hence, our aim here was to illustrate several neglected aspects of
those Games. We have described both the integrated security system and other significant issues relevant to surveillance practices of the Olympics. Additionally, this chapter illustrated how the globalization of threats and international terrorism played a role in national legislation, perceptions of security and risks before the Games, and more importantly, the development of security measures and crisis management during the Olympics. We also accentuated the social context of the Olympics and resistance in the mountain regions to the Games, which, Della Porta claims, was particularly “eventful” due to the “symbolic and physical struggles around the occupied sites in Val di Susa” (2008: 23).

In terms of the surveillance dynamics that were at play, the Winter Games resulted in surveillance measures at the venues, but also at the urban level, mainly because of efforts to monitor vehicle flows and to improve the transportation system. Significantly, the Turin Metro system was the first in Italy to use automated driverless light vehicles fully equipped with real time video surveillance. Therefore, the Olympics did increase surveillance far beyond the venues, and these initiatives were portrayed as being necessary in order to renovate the city and to present it to the international community.

It is interesting to note, however, that the main public issue surrounding the Games was that of environmental impact, not surveillance. The installation of surveillance cameras both at the venues and within the urban context, in particular on public transport, did not raise the type of public concerns as occurred in Greece (Samatas 2008). The increased use of surveillance cameras in the main Italian cities, coupled with the lack of public debate around the potential erosion of privacy, is intriguing. That said, our
understanding of this development is unfortunately limited because empirical research focused on surveillance in Italy is extremely sparse (Fonio 2005; Calenda and Fonio 2010) in comparison to other European countries.

When placed in a larger political and historical context, it is particularly surprising that Italy, a post-authoritarian society with a history of having its citizens exposed to a massive coercive surveillance apparatus, has almost erased such concerns from the collective memory. Such cultural forgetting arguably shaped the minimal level of resistance against the increased use of monitoring devices. It appears that as Italy’s fascist history recedes from lived memory, Italian civil society groups and social movements have redefined their priorities in light of the unique appeal and challenges of events such as the Olympics.

REFERENCES


