



Security & Logistic in a Major Sport Event: The Vendor Certification Program (VCP) of the XX Winter Olympic Games

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Ottobre 2006

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1. Introduction

In the general organization of the XX Winter Olympic Games, to guarantee the security of the Olympic venues, TOROC put in place, in co-operation with Italian Law Enforcement Agencies, a security system for the delivery of goods and materials¹.

More specifically, all goods and materials delivered to the Olympic venues had to be security screened and sealed to confirm first of all that they were free from prohibited items and, secondly, that the integrity of the delivery was not compromised prior to their arrival at the venues.

¹ This article will not analyze the security system adopted at the XX Winter Olympic Games for persons and vehicles.

The aim of this article is to describe this process as it is an example of a security system applied to logistic activities for a major sport event².

2. The security system of the Olympic Venues

2.1.1. The different security rings

The security system applied to the Olympic venues³ during “*games time*”⁴ was characterized by different concentric security layers, identified as “*security rings*” which divided each Olympic venue, from a security point of view, into different areas and each of those areas had different security characteristics and different access rules. The security rings that applied to goods and materials were the following:

The “*soft ring*” was characterized by a perimeter that was not made of a single physical barrier but, instead, consisted of different road blocks. More specifically, the aim of this security ring was to define an area, outside the Olympic venues, accessible to only permitted delivery vehicles through different roadblocks, called Vehicle Permit Checkpoint⁵ (VPC), located at every road leading to an Olympic venue. Authorized delivery vehicles had a specific pass, called a Vehicle Access Parking Permit (VAPP), attached to their windshield, produced and distributed by TOROC. This security layer was named soft ring because of the soft security control of the vehicles (namely the control of the VAPP of the vehicles entering the soft ring area) and no security screens⁶ for persons or vehicles at the VPCs.

The “*hard ring*” was the inner security ring of the Olympic venues and was physically delineated by a protective security barrier characterized by the following:

- Security fence 2.70 meters high
- Security lighting, CCTV surveillance system and anti-intrusion system. This physical protection system was called Integrated Security System (ISS).
- Security patrolling⁷

The “*security ring*” was an additional security area created specifically for two Olympic villages⁸, characterized by an inner perimeter fence (2 meters high) inside the hard ring perimeter (2.70 meters high). At those two Olympic villages, the Vehicles Security Areas (VSAs) and the Mag and Bags (M&Bs) were located on the perimeter of the security rings.

² This article does not analyze in detail the different roles and responsibilities of the organizations, either public or private, involved in the analyzed security system. The activities were carried out by different organizations including several TOROC departments. Furthermore, for simplicity, in this article each TOROC department activity will fall into the broad category of TOROC activity.

³ The Olympic venues were divided into two categories: competitive venues and non competitive venues. Apart from these two categories, there were three Olympic villages.

⁴ Games time is the time period that starts with the Olympic Opening Ceremony and ends with the Olympic Closing Ceremony. In the XX Winter Olympic Games, games time period started the 10th of February with the XX Winter Olympic Opening Ceremony and ended the 26th of February with the XX Winter Olympic Closing Ceremony.

⁵ The Vehicle Permit Checkpoints (VPCs) were managed by TOROC personnel.

⁶ The security screens, carried out by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, were aimed at searching for prohibited items carried by vehicles or persons entering an Olympic venue (the hard ring area).

⁷ The patrolling of the venue perimeters was a security operation executed by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel and TOROC staff. Furthermore, patrolled areas were also all venue operational areas and, in particular, spectator seating areas, field of plays (FoP) and mixed zones (the areas where athletes, press and media could freely access).

⁸ The security ring was created only for the Olympic village of Sestriere and Torino. At the Olympic village of Bardonecchia there was no security ring.

2.1.2. The Venues' Clean Area

The most important principle of the security system applied to the Olympic venues was that their hard ring areas had to be, from a security point of view, completely and absolutely clean. The term “*clean*”⁹ described the status of a venue (but it could have also been applied to a facility, person, vehicle, good or material package) which was known to be free from prohibited, hazardous, explosive devices or materials¹⁰. Prohibited items were those objects, defined by Italian law enforcement agencies, as being “intrinsically dangerous” and were, therefore, prohibited within every Olympic venue. The list of prohibited items included firearms, ammunition, explosives, chemical or incendiary devices and, in general, instruments defined commonly as weapons.

To keep the hard ring area of an Olympic venue clean, the area had to be cleaned (this was accomplished through two different operations: the venue lock down and the security sweep) and then no prohibited items could be brought inside it (this was achieved through the application of the access rules for the Olympic venues).

The lock down, defined as being a state of security readiness, consisted in the activation of all the security measures applied to the Olympic venues. More specifically, with the lock down, all access control measures, at the VSAs and M&Bs, were implemented and enforced. The purpose of the “*venue security sweep*” was to ensure that each Olympic venue was free from prohibited items¹¹ before the start of the Olympic operations in each venue.

At that point, the Olympic venue access rules for person, vehicles and goods / materials had to be enforced to maintain the areas clean from a security point of view. This was done by utilizing only two dedicated access points, on the perimeter of the hard rings, to enter the venue:

- The Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs) for all the vehicles entering the Olympic venues
- The Mag & Bags (M&Bs) for people entering the Olympic venues

This paper will analyze the security system applied for the goods and materials that entered the venues' secure hard ring area.

3. The “5 Keys to the Gate”

The general security principle for goods and materials, applied at the XX Winter Olympic Games, was called “*vendor product integrity*” and consisted in a system that allowed deliveries free from prohibited items to any Olympic Venue. “*Prohibited items*” was the term used to describe all those objects, defined by Italian law enforcement agencies, as being “intrinsically dangerous” (for example hazardous, explosive devices or materials) and, therefore, prohibited within every Olympic venue hard ring.

After the venue lock down, deliveries of goods or materials by “*vendors*” (all Olympic sponsors, Olympic suppliers and other suppliers - in general any firm or company that had

⁹ On the contrary, the term “dirty,” from a security point of view, described the status of an Olympic venue (or site, person, vehicle or material package) which was not known to be free from prohibited, hazardous or explosive items, devices or materials.

¹⁰ All these objects were known, for practical reasons, as “*prohibited items*.”

¹¹ When a place was free from prohibited items, from a security point of view it was called “clean.” From an operational point of view, TOROC personnel supported the activity of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel during the security sweeps by ensuring that all the facilities inside the venues were easily accessible.

to deliver goods or materials inside the venues – are, for simplicity, named vendors) were allowed only if the following “5 keys to the gate” rules¹² were successfully applied:

- Vehicle Access Parking Permit (VAPP)
- Master Delivery Schedule (MDS)
- Clean Deliveries through VCP or MSFs
- Olympic Accreditation Card
- VSAs’ Security Screening

3.1. Vehicle Access Parking Permit (VAPP)

Vendors that had to deliver materials inside the venues had to display, on their vehicles’ windshields, the correct VAPP, which was controlled at the venues’ VPCs and VSAs¹³. More specifically, the first control of the correctness of the delivery vehicles’ VAPP was carried out at the VPCs, situated at the perimeter of the venues’ soft ring and then a second control was performed at the VSAs, on the perimeter of the venues’ hard ring. VAPPs were a specific type of document, managed and distributed by TOROC, used to identify vehicles authorized to enter the venues’ soft ring area or the venues’ hard ring area¹⁴. Any vehicle that did not have the correct VAPP was refused entrance, both at the VPCs and at the VSAs, and a “*turn-away notice*”¹⁵ was given to its driver.

3.2. Master Delivery Schedule (MDS)

All delivery vehicles had to be scheduled on each venue’s Master Delivery Schedule (MDS), a spreadsheet managed by TOROC where the most important information regarding delivery vehicles such as, for example, time and date of arrival and the number plate, were reported. Delivery vehicles that were not scheduled on the MDS (that was controlled in each Olympic venue both at VPCs and at VSAs) received a “*turn-away notice*”.

3.3. Clean Deliveries through VCP or MSFs

It was agreed, by TOROC and Italian law enforcement agencies, that all goods and materials, before being introduced in any Olympic venue, had to be pre-screened & sealed¹⁶ through the two following different processes:

- The “*Vendor Certification Program*” (VCP), or
- The “*Material Screening Facilities*” (MSFs)

¹² A specific policy (and procedure) was developed by TOROC for urgent deliveries to the Olympic venues that did not need to follow all the 5 keys to the venue rules.

¹³ The control of the correctness of VAPPs at the Vehicle Permit Checkpoints (VPCs) and at the Vehicle Security Areas (VSAs) was conducted by TOROC staff.

¹⁴ The types of the Vehicle Access Parking Permits (VAPPs) were different. Broadly speaking, some authorized a vehicle to enter the venues’ soft ring area but not the hard ring area (for example, for vehicles of residents whose apartments or houses were in the soft ring area or, another example, for the vehicles used to deliver goods in shops located inside the soft ring area and, in the meanwhile, outside the hard ring area) and others authorized a vehicle to enter the venue hard ring area (for example, the vehicles used for the transport of the Olympic athletes).

¹⁵ The turn away notice was a document that explained, to the vehicle delivery driver, the reason for not being admitted inside the soft ring of a venue (if the entry was refused at the VPCs) or inside the hard ring (if the entry was refused at the VSAs).

¹⁶ *Vendor product integrity* meant that goods and materials were clean from a security point of view.

3.3.1. Introduction to the Vendor Certification Program (VCP)

The Vendor Certification Program (VCP) allowed selected Olympic vendors to seal the load compartment, containing clean goods, of their delivery vehicles at chosen vendors' warehouse facilities prior to the delivery into any Olympic venue¹⁷.

3.3.2. The Material Screening Facilities (MSFs)

The two Material Screening Facilities (MSFs), managed by TOROC, were used for the security screening of goods and materials of certain Olympic vendors that were not included in the Vendor Certification Program. One MSFs was situated in Turin (the central warehouse) for deliveries to city venues and, in general, for goods that required a visual security screen inspection, and the other one was in Borgone (the mountain warehouse) for deliveries to mountain venues. At each MSF, the following activities were carried out by TOROC staff:

- Control vehicles' VAPP, of the drivers' Olympic accreditation card and the correctness of the deliveries information on the MDS¹⁸
- Unload of goods and materials from authorized vehicles
- Security screen delivered goods and materials with x-ray machines¹⁹
- Store security screened (and therefore clean) goods and materials in a secure temporary storage area
- Upload clean goods and materials into delivery vehicles
- Seal delivery vehicles' load compartments
- Issue, to each driver, the "*Certification of Good Inspection*" for security controls at VPCs and VSAs

3.3.3. The Security Seals

Security seals were utilized, in the VCP warehouses and at each MSF, to seal delivery vehicles' load compartments when clean goods and materials were uploaded. Therefore, a sealed delivery vehicle was identified as carrying clean goods from the point of departure (VCP warehouses or MSFs) to the point of arrival (any Olympic Venues' hard ring area). The security seals were divided into the two following categories:

- Plastic Strap Security Seals – seals characterized by 10 millimeter diameter adjustable locking straps (made out of iron and plastic materials) designed for sealing vehicle load compartments' locking rings (for example, locks of cargo gates or containers)
- Tamper Indicating Security Seals Film – seals characterized by being made of adhesive material, designed for sealing any access point where an adhesive seal could have been applied. Those seals clearly showed any possible attempt of tampering.

3.4. Olympic Accreditation Card Control

Each delivery vehicles' driver had to show the correct Olympic accreditation card at the VSAs (Vehicle Screening Areas) before entering the venues' hard ring area. The drivers who failed to provide the correct accreditation card were refused entry into the venue and were handed a "*turn-away notice*" issued by TOROC staff.

¹⁷ The Vendor Certification Program was successfully tested during other past Olympic Games.

¹⁸ All goods and materials, that needed to be security screened at each MSF, had to be carried by delivery vehicles that had the following characteristics: the vehicle had to have a correct VAPP, the driver had to have a correct Olympic accreditation card and, furthermore, the delivery information had to be correctly placed in the MDS.

¹⁹ At Turin's MSF, visual security screening of goods that could not be screened through x-ray machines, was provided.

3.5. VSAs' Security Screening

At the Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs), all logistic delivery vehicles had to go through a "level 1 security screening"²⁰, a specific type of screen that required the following types of inspections for each vehicle:

- Control of the integrity of the seals and its related documentation²¹ by TOROC staff
- Control of the correctness of the driver' (and, if present, other occupants) Olympic accreditation card by TOROC staff
- Security screens of the driver (and, if present other occupants) through the M&Bs²² by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel
- Security inspection of the driving area by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel
- Security screens of the external part with special equipment by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel

All the above mentioned types of inspection needed to be successfully applied to any delivery vehicle that wanted to go through any VSA of a venue.

4. Vendor Certification Program (VCP) Capabilities

The Vendor Certification Program (VCP) was the plan that certified an Olympic sponsor, an official supplier or another supplier, was able to deliver goods and materials that were free from prohibited items to an Olympic venue.

All vendors that wanted to be included in the VCP had to guarantee one of the following two capabilities²³:

- Be able to inspect, security screen, send through x-ray machines, and seal goods and materials
- Being certified as having a "tamper proof secure supply chain"

Vendors, whose "product integrity" could be guaranteed during all the stages of the supply chain (production, processing, transportation and distribution) did not need to be security screened, with x-ray machines, goods or material that were going to be distributed from their warehouses into any Olympic venue.

To be certified as having a "tamper proof secure supply chain process", sponsors and suppliers had to demonstrate that on their product supply chain specific security standards were implemented. More specifically, as part of the certification process, TOROC reviewed and examined the following capabilities:

- *Product Storage* – Sponsors and suppliers had to be able to, first of all, separate Olympic from non-Olympic goods and then apply an adequate physical protection security system for designated Olympic warehouses dedicated exclusively for Olympic goods or materials
- *Distribution & Transportation* – Sponsors and suppliers had to be able to track and locate, within a very short amount of time, Olympic products from the production to the distribution process

²⁰ Regarding all the vehicles that needed to enter the venues, there were three levels of vehicle security screening conducted within the VSAs. In this paper it will be analyzed the "level 1 security screen", the only one that applied to the delivery vehicles.

²¹ For each security seal there was a certification of good inspection.

²² In each VSA, security technical equipment, like walk through metal detectors or hand wands (portable hand held) metal detectors, were available to Italian law enforcement agencies personnel to security screen vehicles' occupants.

²³ At the end of this process, to deliver clean goods and materials, some vendors were certified as having a "tamper proof security supply chain process," while others used the x-ray security screen process.

- *Documentation* – Sponsors and suppliers had to be able to develop procedures and keep accurate records with regard to all their delivery activities
- *Workforce Training* – Sponsors and suppliers had to be able to adequately train all staff employed in the applied security procedures, thereby better establishing the responsibility of each person in the management of the secure supply chain process²⁴.

5. Vendor Certification Program (VCP) Security Protocols

Different Vendor Certification Program (VCP) security protocols, defined by TOROC in cooperation with Italian law enforcement agencies, had to be implemented by sponsors and suppliers before being certified as being part of the VCP. These security protocols were divided into the following five categories:

- VCP Warehouses
- VCP Personnel
- VCP Vehicles
- VCP Security Seals
- VCP Seals Related Documentation

5.1. VCP Warehouses

Sponsors and suppliers, to be part of the VCP, needed to design and implement, in their warehouses, a designated secure Olympic workspace & loading zone, separated from all the other non-Olympic related areas.

This Olympic area had to be surrounded by an external security fence²⁵, minimum 2.2 meters high, with person and vehicles access points locked and monitored 24 hours a day through CCTV systems and/or dedicated security personnel.

Access to the Olympic warehouse area had to be restricted only to persons that had the correct Olympic accreditation card and that, before entering the secure area, had been security screened, with all their belongings, by designated security personnel. Furthermore, vehicles entering the Olympic area had to be correctly registered on the warehouses' MDS and the vehicles' drivers needed to have a correct Olympic accreditation card²⁶.

5.2. VCP Personnel

Vendors had to select and make available dedicated staff (for example warehouse supervisors, warehouse staff, and drivers) for all the procedures applied to the VCP system. An Olympic accreditation card was given to each staff member to enter the Olympic warehouse areas.

²⁴ Training was conducted by certified security trainer providers identified by TOROC in cooperation with Italian law enforcement agencies.

²⁵ In some warehouses, the security perimeter was composed of a security fence, walls and other physical protection systems already existing that respected the requirements made by TOROC.

²⁶ The Olympic accreditation card was issued by TOROC to persons who had a recognized official function to perform at the Olympic venues or a role or function necessary for staging the Olympic games (in this precise case, the accreditation card had been requested to be issued to all the vendors' drivers). Every person that requested an Olympic Accreditation card had to go through a background check carried out by Italian law enforcement agencies. The accreditation card contained all the information necessary to identify the card holder's roles and access entitlements. Each accredited person was issued one accreditation card only. An accredited person who had multiple roles/functions in different venues was issued only one accreditation card that combined all the different rights. For security measures, while performing an official function, the accreditation card had to be worn all the time inside the venues (and, in this precise case, in the VCP warehouses and in the MSFs) hanging from neck with the front side facing outwards. The holder had to present the card clearly to TOROC personnel at every M&Bs or VSAs (and, as for goods, in every access point of the Olympic VCP warehouses and MSFs).

Furthermore, each vendors nominated a VCP supervisor who, after attending a particular training course on all the security requirements related to the VCP, was the person responsible for the activities of screening, inspection and sealing of the Olympic goods in their warehouse.

5.3. VCP Vehicles

Each vehicle, to be considered adequate for the VCP activities, and therefore keep the sealed cargo compartment carrying clean goods and materials from the warehouse to the venue secure, had to have the following physical characteristics:

- The load compartment had to be separated from the driver's compartment by a physical barrier. Internal access to the cargo compartment from the vehicle's drivers compartment was forbidden.
- The load compartment entry gate had to be equipped with a locking mechanism where TOROC security seals could be applied.
- The load compartment had to be made of solid metal side walls or soft walls, built with a resistant material with no imperfections, in order to be able to recognize possible tampering. All load compartment access points had to be locked and sealed.
- The driver had to have a technical device (for example a mobile phone) that allowed effective communication with its VCP supervisor in case of an emergency.

5.4. VCP Security Seals

Once the VCP vehicles' load compartments were uploaded with clean goods and materials, security seals had to be used to guarantee that those goods and materials remained clean, without any attempt of unauthorized access to the compartment, from the VCP warehouse to the Olympic venues. More specifically, all vehicles' load compartments had to be security sealed prior to their departure from the vendors warehouse to the Olympic venues.

VCP warehouse supervisors, who were the only people authorized to seal vehicles' load compartments, had to fill out the "*Olympic goods security inspection certificate*" for each delivery and give a copy of it to the vehicles' driver in order to make deliveries into venues. Italian law enforcement agencies personnel and TOROC staff at the VPCs and VSAs had the responsibility to redirect any VCP vehicle with a tampered seal, or without the correct documentation, to the nearest Material Screening Facility (MSF) to re-screen the goods and materials and reseal the vehicle load compartment. Only after each delivery vehicle complied with these security protocols was it permitted to enter an Olympic venue and unload its supplies.

5.5. VCP Seals Related Documentation

The documents used for the management of the Olympic security seals were the following:

- *TOROC Master Security Seal Register* – in this register, managed by TOROC staff, the information regarding the quantity and specific numbers of the security seals distributed to each vendor was reported²⁷
- *Vendor Olympic Security Seal Register* – in this register, managed by each VCP supervisor, information on each used security seal, such as the number, date of issue, vehicle information (for example the destination and number plates) to which each seal was applied was reported
- *Olympic Goods Security Inspection Certificate* – this certificate²⁸, managed by VCP supervisor or by TOROC staff, information on each delivery vehicle prior to its

²⁷ TOROC Master Security Seal Register was kept in a secure and separate place from the security seals. Security seals were also distributed to certain TOROC departments for their operational activities.

departure from a VCP warehouse or from a MSF to an Olympic venue was reported. A copy of the certificate was given to the driver for checks at Olympic venues²⁹, while a copy of the document remained with the VCP supervisor³⁰

In each VCP warehouse, the vendor Olympic security seal register, the security seals and the Olympic goods security inspection certificates were managed exclusively by the VCP supervisors³¹.

6. Vendor Certification Program (VCP) Process

The certification of the vendors that intended to be part of the Vendor Certification Program (VCP) consisted in a detailed process made of the following steps:

- *Pre-Certification Vendor Security Review* - this review, conducted by TOROC staff, consisted in assisting the vendors in the preparation of the “*VCP Certification Security Audit*”. The pre-certification vendor security review required vendors to fill out a security questionnaire regarding the security systems applied in their “would be” VCP warehouse and to all the different process of their supply chain process
- *Preliminary VCP warehouse site visit* - a site security survey was conducted, by TOROC staff, to each vendor to review existed security measures at the Olympic warehouse and in the supply chain process. TOROC staff assisted each vendor in putting in place all the security protocols required for the VCP
- *VCP Security Audit* - the VCP certification audit, conduct by TOROC staff with the cooperation of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, was a formal review of the vendor’s conformity with the VCP security protocols. In case the VCP requirements were not entirely meet, TOROC notified the vendor which security measures had to be taken to become part of the VCP
- *VCP Supervisors Training Workshop* – TOROC staff organized a two day training session for the VCP supervisors. A “*VCP Operation Manual*”, containing a detailed description of all the security procedures & protocols that each vendor had to observe, was distributed to each VCP Supervisor
- *Security Seals Distribution to Vendors* – security seals (sequentially numbered) and the related documentation, were distributed to each vendor based on the specific requirements analyzed (for example, the total number of deliveries made by each vendor to the venues)
- *Pre Games VCP Compliance Inspection* – a final inspection, prior to the beginning of the VCP operations, to vendor warehouses was conducted by TOROC staff
- *Certification* – an official VCP certification was issued by TOROC staff to each vendor that observed all VCP security protocols
- *Games Time Inspection* - during games time operations, TOROC staff and Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, conducted random inspections of vendor Olympic warehouses and supply chain product facilities to assert that all the VCP requirements were continually met during Olympic operations

²⁸ The information reported into the certificate for each delivery vehicle were: company name, venue destination, TOROC department that requested the delivery, type of delivery, type of vehicle, name of the driver and possible occupants, seal number, “*milk run*” or single delivery, name of VCP supervisor.

²⁹ The checks could take place at the VPCs and VSAs by both Italian law enforcement agencies personnel and TOROC staff.

³⁰ In each VCP warehouse and in each MSF, Olympic goods security inspection certificates had to be kept in a secure and separate place from the security seals.

³¹ In the event of any problem related to the security seals and their documentations, the VCP supervisor had to immediately inform TOROC staff and Italian law enforcement agencies.

7. Multiple Deliveries: the “Milk Run”

During games time operations, several VCP vehicles were required to deliver goods and materials to different Olympic venues on the same delivery run. These deliveries were commonly known as “*Milk Runs*”. Milk run deliveries were planned and scheduled on the Master Delivery Schedule (MDS) of each venue by TOROC staff. Only vehicles that had been pre-screened and sealed through the Vendor Certification Program or through the designed Olympic Material Screening Facilities (MSFs) were authorized to conduct the milk run deliveries. The following is an example of a milk run by a VCP delivery vehicle:

- On arrival to the VPC, at the perimeter of the venues’ soft ring area, TOROC staff, supported by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, controlled the VCP delivery vehicle for the presence of VAPP, MDS and security seals
- On arrival to the VSA, at the perimeter of the Olympic venues’ hard ring area, TOROC staff and Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, controlled the VCP delivery vehicle for the MDS, the “*Olympic Goods Security Inspection Certificate*”, the integrity of the security seals, the Olympic accreditation card of the driver and the VAPP. Furthermore, a level 1 security screening of the vehicle took place (including the security screening of the driver)
- The VCP delivery vehicle was authorized to pass through the VSA to unload the goods at the delivery point within the venue
- TOROC staff resealed the vehicle’s load compartment with a new security seal after the unload operations were finished. The resealing of vehicle may have been supervised by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel
- The “*Olympic Goods Security Inspection Certificate*” was changed (amended) by authorized TOROC staff and a copy was given to the driver
- The VCP vehicle departed from the venue for the next scheduled delivery in another Olympic venue, where the mentioned procedures began again

8. Small Deliveries: the Material Transfer Areas (MTAs)

Vehicles of non-VCP vendors that had to deliver small quantities of goods and materials (loading unit less than one pallet size) to one of the three Olympic villages, were not compelled to go to one of the two MSFs to have their goods security screened and sealed. In fact, those vehicles could use the Village Material Transfer Area (MTA), a secure area located outside the hard ring perimeter of each village (near a VSA) where it was possible to unload, security screen, store in a secure area, and then reload the clean goods to designated TOROC vehicles and finally deliver the goods inside the venue.

The aim of the MTA was to speed up the security screening process, through the use of x-ray machines, of small vendors’ deliveries that were not part of the Vendor Certification Program (VCP).

9. Vendor Certification Program (VCP) Benefits

The Vendor Certification Program was an important component of the overall security system applied in the XX Winter Olympic Games. For the local organizing committee (TOROC), the VCP assured the application of a well organized security process for the majority of the Olympic venue deliveries.

For the different vendors, the VCP permitted a high level of service for Olympic clients (for example the spectators inside the venues) simultaneously allowing the application of a complex security system for all the goods and materials directed to the Olympic venues. Furthermore, the VCP preserved the internal supply chain of production and distribution, enabling vendors autonomy because they could organize all the delivery activities by themselves, without using the two MSFs managed by TOROC.

10. Glossary of Terms

Clean / Dirty - **Clean** described the status of a venue, site, person, vehicle, good or material known to be free from prohibited, restricted, hazardous or explosive devices or items. The term **dirty** described the status of a venue, site, person, vehicle, good or material not known to be free from prohibited, restricted, hazardous or explosive devices or items.

Closed Circuit Television / CCTV - A closed circuit television system where digital video was transmitted from security cameras to a CCTV monitoring room (Venue Security Control Room).

Critical Areas - Areas in an Olympic venue that were deemed to be critical from a security or operational perspective. These areas included: VIP areas, broadcasting compounds, power substations, spectator seating, etc.

Critical Asset - Any asset or equipment that could not be removed, damaged or destroyed without significantly disrupting Olympic games operations (for example Olympic venues, Olympic transportation vehicles, Olympic communication infrastructure and logistic compounds)

Explosives Detection Dog / EDD - Highly trained dogs that were trained to respond to the presence of explosive materials or those substances that indicated the presence of explosives, during a security sweep or search.

Games Operations - The operations period for Olympic venues which was determined by commencement activities on venue by designated Olympic constituent groups and concluded on completion of the final activity on venue by designated Olympic constituent groups.

Games Time - A period of time defined as beginning of the Olympic opening ceremony and ending with the end of the Olympic closing ceremony.

Handheld Metal Detectors Hand Wands - A handheld, mobile device that alerted an operator to the presence of metal objects on a person.

Hard Ring - The hard ring of the venue was constituted by a secure perimeter which provided a physical protective barrier around the venue's operational zones. The hard ring consisted of security fencing, security lighting, CCTV systems and security patrols.

Improvised Explosive Device / IED - A constructed self-made device, which contained explosive, pyrotechnics or incendiary chemical substances, intended to damage property and people. IEDs could have been small (delivered by an individual) or large (delivered by vehicle).

Integrated Security System / ISS - The technical security systems that supported the detection and deterrence of intrusions to the hard ring (secure perimeter).

Lock Down - Lock Down was defined as being a state of security readiness where all the security and access control measures were implemented and enforced by Italian law enforcement and TOROC staff. Security and access control measures included accreditation and VAPP control, security screening for pedestrians, vehicle and goods / materials; activation of integrated security systems and commencement of internal and external security patrols. The venues had to be "*locked down*" before the start of the security sweeps.

Mag and Bag / M&B - Security screening of ticketed and accredited persons through a combination of walk through metal detectors (mags) and physical inspection or x-ray screening of personal items (bags or hand carried items).

Master Delivery Schedule / MDS - The Master Delivery Schedule (MDS) was a logistics and security process where all pre-requisite delivery information was submitted by the vendor to the Logistics Olympic Centre (LOC). Italian law enforcement agencies were responsible for resolving security issues related to the MDS

Material Screening Facility / MSF - Material Screening Facilities (MSF) were designated facilities operated by TOROC where vendors who were not part of the Vendor Certification Program could have their goods security screened and sealed on a “*user pays basis*” (pay per use basis).

Material Transfer Area / MTA - A designated area (usually co-located with the VSA) where vendor goods (not previously security screened) were security screened through x-ray machines. The delivery was scheduled on the MDS and was restricted to small deliveries of less than one pallet. MTAs were only at Olympic Villages.

Milk Run - A milk run was a scheduled delivery run by a vendor where multiple deliveries occurred to more than one Olympic venue.

Olympic Goods Security Inspection Certificate - The Olympic Goods & Services Security Inspection Certificate was an operational document which certified that goods contained within an authorized Olympic delivery vehicle (security sealed) were free from prohibited items.

Olympic Venue Security Sweep Schedule / OVSSS - A coordinated schedule (spreadsheet) that detailed the key operational dates (lock down and security sweep) and resource allocation for the conduct of venue security sweep by specialized Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

Prohibited Items - Prohibited items were those items determined by Italian law enforcement agencies as being “intrinsically dangerous” and therefore prohibited within the Olympic venues. The prohibited items list included firearms, ammunition, and other instruments defined by the law as weapons, explosives, chemical and incendiary devices.

Security Lighting - Lighting units/systems existing or specifically installed to provide illumination for visual and CCTV surveillance of secure perimeters, designated critical areas and venue access points.

Security Ring - The designated security perimeter where all persons were security screened (Mag & Bag) prior to entering inside any Olympic Village (only where it applied).

Security Screening - The security check of persons, materials, or vehicles using special search methods and equipment to identify and locate prohibited items prior to entry into a venue’s hard ring.

Security Seals - Security film labels or plastic fastener security straps which clearly indicated evidence of tampering, unauthorized access or removal. Security seals were used to seal compartments or other areas as part of the venue security sweep, vehicle screening, Vendor Certification Program (VCP) and Olympic Material Screening Facility (MSFs) for goods and materials.

Security Sweep - A security search conducted by specialized Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, to ensure that all Olympic venues were free from any prohibited or hazardous item that could have posed a threat to the security and safety of venues and its occupants.

Soft Ring - The soft ring was a non-physical barrier, determined by TOROC and Italian law enforcement agencies, where only authorized Olympic VAPP’s vehicles were allowed to pass beyond a Vehicle Permit Checkpoint (VPC).

Turn Away Notice - The turn-away notice was an operational form issued at VPC’s or VSAs to delivery vehicles which did not meet the 5 keys to the venue rules.

Urban Domain - A public space located outside a venue’s soft ring that was managed by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

Vehicle Permit Checkpoint / VPC – The VPC was a soft security checkpoint located on any designated Olympic access road leading into the venue’s soft ring perimeter where all delivery vehicles’ VAPP, MDS and seals were checked by TOROC staff.

Vehicle Screening Area / VSA - The VSA was a designated area where all vehicles were security screened by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel to ensure that the vehicle and occupants were free from prohibited items prior to entry through the venue's hard ring.

Vendor - Any TOROC approved Olympic partner, sponsor or supplier authorized to provide goods and materials during the XX Winter Olympic Games, into the venues.

Vendor Certification Program / VCP - The purpose of the Vendor Certification Program was to allow authorized and certified vendors to pre-screen and seal their goods at their designated vendor warehouse facilities prior to the delivery to an Olympic venue. The VCP process facilitated a higher level of service to the Vendor Certification Program participants, as it authorized vendors to utilize their own facilities to screen and seal deliveries instead of the requirement to transport their goods to the Olympic Material Screening Facility for security screening.

Venue Security Control Room / VSCR - The TOROC command centre for the coordination and management of security operations within each venue. It was also the location of all monitoring equipment for the Integrated Security Systems (CCTV, motion sensors, alarms, etc).

Walk Through Metal Detector / Mag - A walk through pedestrian screening device that used magnetic characteristics to detect specific metallic items.

X-Ray Machine - An apparatus, fixed or portable, operated by security personnel, using low-level x-ray technology to detect and identify prohibited items.