



The Security system of the XX Winter Olympic Games

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1. Introduction: The Security System of the Olympic Venues

The scope of this article¹ is to describe the security system implemented for the XX Winter Olympic Games. More specifically, this article analyzes the different security layers of the Olympic venues and the rules of access for people and vehicles².

The security operations here described were carried out by personnel from Italian law enforcement agencies in cooperation with TOROC³ staff⁴. In this regard, this article gives a

¹ For a thorough understanding of all the terms related to the security of the XX Winter Olympic Games contained in this document refer to the "Glossary of Terms" at the end.

² This article analyzes only the access rules for people and vehicles inside the Olympic venues. More specifically, goods access rules, which followed the "5 keys to the gate" policy and procedure, are not described in this document.

³ TOROC was the acronym of the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) for the XX Winter Olympic Games called Turin / Torino Organizing Committee (TOROC).

broad look at several security principles applied to the XX Winter Olympic Games and does not analyze the different roles and responsibilities of the organizations, either public and private, involved⁵.

2. The Olympic Venues' Security Layers

2.1. Introduction

The description of the security system applied to the Olympic venues⁶ during “*games time*”⁷ starts with the description of the different concentric security layers, identified as “*security rings*”. These security rings divided each Olympic venue, from a security point of view, into different areas and each of those areas had different security characteristics and different access rules.

2.2. The Controlled Area

The “*controlled area*,” the first security layer, consisted of an area around the Olympic venues where Italian law enforcement agencies personnel⁸ monitored all the activities that were taking place. The characteristics of this area were that it was not surrounded by a perimeter (for example by a fence) and, furthermore, that it was of public domain (this area, for example, was of public roads, shops and buildings that were near the Olympic venues).

Therefore, the controlled area was characterized by not being a restricted zone (people and vehicles could enter it without any restriction) but by being an area where Italian law enforcement agencies personnel were supervising it to prevent any possible threat against physical assets and people in the vicinity of the Olympic venues.

2.3. The Soft Ring

The “*soft ring*,” the second security layer around the Olympic venues, was characterized by a perimeter that was not made of a single physical barrier but, instead, consisted of different road blocks.

More specifically, the aim of this security ring was to define an area, outside the Olympic venues, accessible to only permitted vehicles through different roadblocks, named Vehicle

⁴ TOROC Games Security was the department in charge of planning and implementing the physical protection system in the Olympic venues, in cooperation with Italian law enforcement agencies. In this article, for simplicity, TOROC Games Security activities are included in the broad category of TOROC activities carried out in the venues.

⁵ It is sufficient to inform that, at each venue, both TOROC Games Security and Italian law enforcement agencies each had their own personnel responsible for their activities and staff. A senior staff member called a Venue Security Manager (VSM) was in charge of TOROC Games Security operations and staff members, while a police or a military police officer named Venue Commander was in command of personnel and activities of Italian law enforcement and public safety agencies. One of the main tasks of TOROC Games Security was the coordination and integration of its activities and personnel with those of Italian law enforcement and public safety agencies.

⁶ The Olympic venues were divided into two categories: competitive venues and non competitive venues. Furthermore, the first ones were divided into front of house (FoH), the area where spectators with valid tickets and workforce with valid Olympic accreditation cards could enter, and back of house (BoH), the operative area where only workforce could access with valid Olympic accreditation cards. Apart from these two categories, there were three Olympic villages.

⁷ Games time is the time period that starts with the Olympic Opening Ceremony and ends with the Olympic Closing Ceremony. In the XX Winter Olympic Games, games time period started the 10th of February with the XX Winter Olympic Opening Ceremony and ended the 26th of February with the XX Winter Olympic Closing Ceremony.

⁸ In these areas, being a public domain, TOROC had absolutely no role. Therefore, TOROC personnel had no responsibility in these controlled areas.

Permit Checkpoint⁹ (VPC), located at every road leading to the Olympic venues. During games time, only permitted vehicles could enter through the VPCs and, therefore, gain access to the soft ring area.

Permitted vehicles had a specific pass, named Vehicle Access Parking Permit¹⁰ (VAPP), attached to their windshield, produced and distributed by TOROC.

This security layer was named soft ring because of the soft security control of the vehicles (namely the control of the VAPP of the vehicles entering the soft ring area) and no security screens¹¹ for persons or vehicles at the VPCs.

2.4. The Hard Ring

The “*hard ring*” was the third and ultimate security ring of the Olympic venues. It was physically delimited by a protective security barrier characterized by the following security characteristics:

- Security fence 2.70 meters high
- Security lighting, CCTV surveillance system and anti-intrusion system. This physical protection system was called Integrated Security System (ISS)
- Security patrolling¹²

The hard ring perimeter (the physical protective barrier around the Olympic venues) was made, in many cases, of different physical components like, for example, buildings or walls that share their perimeter with the ones of the hard rings.

2.4.1. The Hard Ring’s Integrated Security System (ISS)

The integrated security system (ISS) was a physical protection security system implemented in each Olympic venue for the detection (and deterrence) of intrusions into the hard ring area through the use of three different security technical equipment: security lighting, CCTV surveillance system and anti-intrusion system.

Lighting systems were set up, in each Olympic venue, to adequately illuminate the perimeter and the most important areas in the venue hard ring for the CCTV system and patrolling activities.

The aim of the CCTV surveillance systems was to monitor the venue perimeter through fixed cameras, positioned every 60 meters along the perimeter of the venue’s hard ring, and dome cameras, characterized by high resolution and zooming capacities (their range was about 100 meters), positioned in critical areas with sound observational potentials. These cameras (both fixed and dome) were linked to a CCTV monitor room situated in the venue security control room (VSCR) and supervised by TOROC staff 24 hours a day.

The anti intrusion system was linked to the CCTV cameras to detect any unauthorized adversaries entering an Olympic venue’s hard ring perimeter. This system, connected to the CCTV system through electronic sensors in the cameras, enabled the visualization of any detected attempt of intrusion.

⁹ The Vehicle Permit Checkpoints (VPCs) were managed by TOROC personnel.

¹⁰ The Vehicle Access Parking Permits (VAPPs) were given by TOROC to vehicles that had to enter an Olympic venue or needed to enter the soft ring area without entering the Venue hard ring (for example, the vehicles of residents whose apartments or houses were in the soft ring area or the vehicles used to deliver goods in shops located inside the soft ring area but outside the hard ring area).

¹¹ The security screens, carried out by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, aimed at the searching for prohibited items carried by vehicles or persons entering an Olympic venue (the hard ring area).

¹² The patrolling of the venue perimeters was a security operation executed by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel and TOROC staff. Furthermore, patrolled areas were also all the venue operational areas and, in particular, the spectator seating areas, the field of plays (FoP) and the mixed zones (the areas where athletes, press and media could freely access).

In the VSCR, the system immediately reproduced live, through monitors supervised by trained TOROC staff operators, the images from the area where an intrusion was happening. In this way the operator could assess if the alarm was a nuisance alarm or if it was a real alarm, therefore reporting it to TOROC staff and Italian law enforcement agencies personnel. More specifically, in the VSCR two different groups of monitors displayed two different images. One group of monitors showed a cartographic map with all the graphics and textual information of the CCTV system, while the other group of monitors allowed the visualization of the signals from all the cameras.

Thanks to this system, TOROC staff was able to select cameras, see the images that the selected cameras were reproducing, move selected dome cameras to follow a specific object or situation and, in the meanwhile, be alerted by the system itself if an unauthorized intrusion was detected.

2.5. The Security Ring

The “*security ring*” was an additional security area created specifically for two Olympic villages¹³. More specifically, the security ring was characterized by an inner perimeter fence (2 meters high) inside the hard ring perimeter (2.70 meters high).

In those two Olympic villages, the Vehicles Security Areas (VSAs) and the Mag and Bags (M&Bs) were located on the perimeter of the security rings¹⁴.

3. Establishing “Clean” Hard Rings

3.1. Olympic Venues as Clean Areas

The most important principle of the security system applied to the Olympic venues was that the hard rings area of venues had to be, from a security point of view, completely and absolutely clean. The term “*clean*”¹⁵ described the status of a venue (but it could have also been applied to a facility, person, vehicle, good or material package) which was known to be free from prohibited, hazardous, explosive devices or materials¹⁶. Prohibited items were those objects, defined by Italian law enforcement agencies, as being “intrinsicly dangerous” and were, therefore, prohibited within every Olympic venue.

The list of prohibited items included firearms, ammunition, explosives, chemical or incendiary devices and, in general, instruments defined commonly as weapons.

To keep the hard ring area of an Olympic venue clean, two simultaneously conditions needed to occur:

- The hard ring area had to be a clean
- Once the hard ring was clean, no prohibited items could have been brought inside it

A clean hard ring area was accomplished through two different operations: the venue lock down and the security sweep. Keeping the hard ring area clean was achieved through the application of the access rules of the Olympic venues.

¹³ The security ring was created only for the Olympic village of Sestriere and Torino. At the Olympic village of Bardonecchia there was no security ring.

¹⁴ There were additional security measures at Olympic villages such as, for example, reflective films on residential windows which provided external direct line of sight.

¹⁵ On the contrary, the term “dirty,” from a security point of view, described the status of an Olympic venue (or site, person, vehicle or material package) which was not known to be free from prohibited, hazardous or explosive items, devices or materials.

¹⁶ All these objects were known, for practical reasons, as “*prohibited* items.”

3.2. Venue Lock Down

As previously said, the “*lock down*” of Olympic venues was the first action to be taken for the creation of a clean hard ring, from a security point of view. The lock down, defined as being a state of security readiness, consisted in the activation of all the security measures applied to the Olympic venues.

More specifically, with the lock down, all access control measures, at the VSAs and M&Bs, were implemented and enforced. To activate the venue lock down, the following activities, for each Olympic Venue, had to be performed:

- Activation of venue access security screening operations at VSAs and M&Bs
- Activation of the physical protection systems (called ISS) for the detection of possible adversaries (perimeter lighting, CCTV and anti-intrusion detection system)
- Activation of the venue security control room¹⁷ (VSCR)
- Activation of the hard ring perimeter security patrolling

After the lock down, that had to take place just before the start of the venue security sweep, no person, vehicle or goods were permitted to enter the venue without being subjected to the venue access rules.

3.3. Venue Security Sweep

The purpose of the “*venue security sweep*” was to ensure that each Olympic venue was free from prohibited items¹⁸ before the start of the Olympic operations in each venue. The venue security sweep was conducted by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, utilizing special equipment (for example explosive detection dogs were used among other methods) with the cooperation of TOROC staff¹⁹, in all Olympic venues in accordance with the Olympic Venue Security Sweep Schedule²⁰ (OVSSS) provided. For the Olympic venues, two types of security sweeps existed²¹:

- The scheduled security sweep - when the exact date and time of the sweep was scheduled, planned and reported in the OVSSS. Typically, this type of security sweep was completed, for every Olympic venue, in no later than one or maximum two days²² before the games time period
- The unscheduled security sweep – when, after the lock down and the scheduled security sweep, during the games time period, the integrity of the security of a venue was significantly compromised²³ or, for example, a bomb threat was assessed as being

¹⁷ The Venue Security Control Room was the centre, in each Olympic venue, for the coordination and management of TOROC security operations within the venue. Furthermore, it was the location of all monitoring equipment for the detection physical protection system (CCTV and anti-intrusion detection system).

¹⁸ When a place was free from prohibited items, from a security point of view it was called “clean.” From an operational point of view, TOROC personnel supported the activity of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel during the security sweeps by ensuring that all the facilities inside the venues were easily accessible.

¹⁹ From an operational point of view, TOROC personnel supported the activity of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

²⁰ The OVSSS was a timetable containing the date and hour for each Olympic venue for the start of the security sweep.

²¹ For the XX Winter Olympic Games, only the scheduled security screen was utilized.

²² The time required for the scheduled security sweep depended on the size of the venue and the type and size of the equipment in it (for example, the technical equipment at the Main Media Centre required an *ad hoc* security sweep). In general, the timeframe to complete a scheduled venue security sweep was approximately 12 hours.

²³ The security of a venue could have been compromised through the unauthorized access of people, vehicles or goods without before being security screened.

“credible” by Italian law enforcement agencies. In these cases, a full or partial re-sweep of the Olympic venue would have been necessary.

The time necessarily for each venue security sweep was dependent on:

- The size, complexity and type of equipment present in the venue at the time of the sweep
- The number of specialized law enforcement agencies personnel employed for the security sweeps

4. Olympic Venues Access Rules

Once the Olympic venues were clean and the security systems activated, there were only two ways for vehicles and people to enter the hard ring area:

- Through the VSAs (for vehicles and its occupants)
- Through the M&Bs (for people)

4.1. The Principles Behind the Olympic Venues’ Access Rules

The Olympic venues access rules, that consisted in the rules for people and vehicles that needed to gain access into the clean hard ring areas, were characterized by two principles:

- TOROC determined “*who and what*” could enter the Olympic venues (in other words, TOROC determined who had the “*privileges of access*”). Therefore, to enter the venues, access documents (VAPPs, Olympic accreditation cards and tickets) were produced and distributed by TOROC. Therefore, people needed to have a correct Olympic accreditation card or a valid ticket (if spectators) while vehicles needed a correct Vehicle Access Parking Permit (VAPP) to enter any venue. The control of the possession of these documents was performed by TOROC staff at M&Bs, VPCs and VSAs
- Italian law enforcement agencies carried out a security screening of persons and vehicles (after they were authorized to enter a venue once they showed the correct access documents to TOROC staff) with the aim of avoiding any prohibited items entering the venues. The security screening²⁴ was defined as the control of persons, materials, and vehicles, using different methods and equipment, at defined entry points on the perimeter of the hard rings (M&Bs for people and VSAs for vehicles and its occupants) to identify, locate and refuse the entrance, inside the Olympic venues, of prohibited items.

4.2. The Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs)

The Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs) were designated areas, located on the perimeter of the hard rings, utilized as access points for all the vehicles entering the Olympic venues.

To enter the venues, vehicles had to have a valid VAPP and its occupants had to have valid Olympic accreditation cards²⁵. Furthermore, to ensure that the vehicles and its occupants were free from prohibited items, they were security screened²⁶ by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel. The VSAs were situated at the perimeter of the hard

²⁴ Italian law enforcement agencies determined the level and the typology of the security screening required to ensure that no person, vehicle or goods carried any prohibited item.

²⁵ People with tickets had to enter through specific M&Bs situated near the spectators’ tribunes. It was forbidden for spectators to enter through the VSAs or other M&Bs.

²⁶ Regarding the operations conducted at the Vehicle Screening Area (VSA), the security screening of the vehicles and its occupants was the responsibility of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, while TOROC personnel had only administrative roles such as controlling vehicle VAPPs and people’s accreditation.

rings, at a location where there was sufficient space to conduct all security screening operations and where there was a distance of at least 100 meters from the Olympic venues' more important facilities²⁷.

4.3. The Three Levels of Vehicles Screening at the VSAs

There were three levels of vehicle security screening conducted within the VSAs. In fact, the level of security that a vehicle received at the VSAs was determined by different information²⁸, such as the origin of the vehicle (for example if the vehicle was arriving from another Olympic venue or if it was a designated Olympic athletes transport system vehicle travelling through the "Bubble to Bubble"²⁹ system), if the vehicle deviated from the designated Olympic road network (ORN), if the vehicle was escorted by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel or if the vehicle was going inside the hard ring (in some cases vehicles were going through VSAs but not entering the hard ring perimeter³⁰).

- Level 1 - High Level (Full Screening). The purpose of this security screening was to prohibit the introduction of an "IED - Improvised Explosive Device" or, in general, a prohibited item into the hard ring. In level 1, all vehicle occupants had to pass through 'Mag & Bags' security screening at the VSAs³¹
- Level 2 - Medium Level (Modified Full Screening - "Boot and Bonnet"). The purpose of level 2 security screening was to prevent the potential threat from a 'IED - Improvised Explosive Device' entering the area around the Venues. It consisted in the security screening of the external parts of the vehicles, including boots and bonnets, without the security screens of the inside of the vehicle and its occupants. Level 2 was for vehicles that were not entering the hard ring area but that, at the same time, had to go, through a VSA, very near the hard ring perimeter.
- Level 3 - Low Level (External Screening). The purpose of level 3 screening was to confirm that previous security screening of authorized TOROC vehicles for athletes travelling through the "bubble to bubble" system had not been compromised (therefore that vehicles were still "clean"). Level 3 consisted in security screens at the VSAs of only the external parts of the vehicles.

Vehicles exit gates (VEGs) were situated on the perimeter of the hard rings to allow vehicles to exit venues without being an obstacle to entry flows. VEGs were staffed by TOROC staff to ensure that any vehicles (or persons) didn't attempt to enter the venue without going through VSAs (or M&Bs).

4.4. Vehicles Access to the Olympic Venues

This paragraph summarizes the security system employed for screening vehicles entering Olympic venues. The vehicles that needed to enter any Olympic venue were screened

²⁷ The most important facilities in an Olympic venue were identified as the "field of play", "spectator tribunes", several sensitive operational areas (e.g. the broadcasting compound) and the "doping control station".

²⁸ The decision regarding which level of security screens applied to each vehicle at the VSAs was taken by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

²⁹ The bubble to bubble (B2B) system was an *ad hoc* travel system that permitted athletes to move, in a clean bubble, between, to and from Olympic venues and Olympic Villages and vice versa. Therefore, those specific vehicles, carrying athletes and arriving from a secure area, had to go through a level three security screening at the VSAs because the inside of those vehicles were considered clean.

³⁰ In exceptional situations, in some Olympic venues the VSAs were not on the perimeter of the hard ring therefore it was possible that a vehicle, going through the VSA, was not going inside the hard ring area but in an other area between them (e.g. a parking area outside an Olympic venue hard ring).

³¹ At each VSA there was a M&B for the security screening of the vehicles' occupants.

both at the perimeter of the soft ring - at the Vehicle Permit Checkpoints (VPCs) - and at the perimeter of the hard ring - at the Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs).

At the Vehicle Permit Checkpoints (VPCs), the roadblocks located on the roads that lead to the Olympic Venues, TOROC staff conducted a visual check if the vehicle had a valid Vehicle Access Permit Parking (VAPP) that allowed them access into the venue soft ring³². Vehicles which did not have a valid VAPP or that did not have any VAPP at all, were turned away³³.

At the Vehicle Screening Areas (VSAs), the areas situated at the perimeter of the venue hard ring perimeters, TOROC staff performed a second visual check of the vehicle's VAPP and then screened the Olympic accreditation cards of the vehicle's occupants. If those requirements were valid, the vehicles and the vehicles' occupants entering the venues and were security screened by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel³⁴ to ensure that they were free from carrying prohibited items.

The VSAs were all situated at locations where there was sufficient space to conduct security screening operations with a minimum safe distance of 100 meters from the critical areas of the venue

The most important difference between the VPCs and the VSAs was that the VPCs only controlled vehicles' VAPP whereas the VSAs controlled the VAPPs, the Olympic accreditation card of the vehicles' occupants and a security screening was carried out both for the vehicles and its occupants.

4.5. The Mag & Bags (M&Bs)

The Mag & Bags (M&Bs), situated on the perimeter of the hard rings, were the access points for the people who wanted to enter the Olympic venues.

To enter into the venues, people had to carry with them an Olympic accreditation card³⁵ or a valid ticket³⁶ (if they were spectators) and had to go through a security screening³⁷ by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel that utilized a combination of the following security equipments:

- Walk through metal detectors (Mags)
- Hand wands (portable / handheld metal detectors)

³² There were different categories of VAPPs. Some VAPPs gave access through the VPCs into the soft rings while others gave access also through the VSAs into the hard rings. Therefore it was possible that a VAPP was valid to enter the soft ring but not valid to enter the hard ring area. That is why at the VSAs there was another VAPPs control by TOROC staff.

³³ In these cases, a turn away notice was handed. It reported why the vehicle was not allowed to enter inside the soft ring. Turn away notices were also handed out at the VSAs.

³⁴ Specially trained law enforcement personnel were responsible for the conduct of VSAs security screening operations.

³⁵ The Olympic accreditation card was issued by TOROC to persons who had a recognized official function to perform at the Olympic venues or a role or function necessary for staging the Olympic games. Every person that requested an Olympic Accreditation card had to go through a background check carried out by Italian law enforcement agencies. The accreditation card contained all the information necessary to identify the card holder's roles and access entitlements. Each accredited person was issued with one accreditation card only. An accredited person who had multiple roles/functions in different venues was issued only one accreditation card that combined all the different rights. For security measures, while performing an official function, the accreditation card had to be worn all the time inside the venues hanging from neck, the front side facing outwards. The holder had to present the card clearly to TOROC personnel at every M&Bs or VSAs.

³⁶ At the M&Bs, TOROC personnel ripped the valid tickets to prevent their re-use. Valid tickets were ripped only when the spectators were security screened in order to avoid any ticketed related problem if a person was found with a prohibited item and was refused entry inside the venue.

³⁷ The security screening at the M&B was performed by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, while TOROC personnel had only the responsibility to control people's Olympic accreditation card and ticket.

- X-ray machines
- Tables for manual inspection of people's bags (Bags)

The security inspection consisted in screening persons and their belonging (bags or hand carried items) to ensure that no prohibited items entered the Olympic venues. Regarding the operability of the M&Bs, two important security principles were applied during games time were:

- The separation of the flows of the different Olympic client groups to enter the venues. More specifically, the Olympic clients were differentiated into different broad categories (athletes, media, workforce, spectators, Olympic family, dignitaries, etc...) and each of them had a specific M&B to enter the Venue³⁸.
- The security screening of each person entering the venue was performed regardless of the Olympic category to which the person applied³⁹

A generic operational model for a Mag & Bag area can be depicted as two generic M&B tents, each of 5x5 meters, furnished with equipment used for security screenings (metal detectors, hand wand detectors, x-ray machines and tables for the bag search). More specifically, in one tent there it could be one x-ray machine and two metal detectors, while in the other tent there it could be two metal detectors and two tables for manual bag inspections.

On the perimeter of the hard rings, near the M&Bs areas, pedestrian exit gates (PEGs) were designed for allowing people to leave the venue without abstracting people entry flows at the M&Bs. PEGs were staffed by TOROC staff who ensured that spectators or accredited persons did not attempt to enter the venue from these gateways.

5. Glossary of Terms

Back of House BOH - Referred to operational areas within the Venue that could only be accessed by TOROC staff, workforce or guests with an official Olympic accreditation card (e.g. logistics compounds, broadcaster compounds, etc...).

Clean / Dirty – “Clean” described the status of a venue or site, person, vehicle or material package which was known to be free from prohibited, restricted, hazardous or explosive devices or materials. “Dirty” described the status of a venue or site, person, vehicle or material package which was not known to be free from prohibited, restricted, hazardous or explosive devices or materials.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) - A closed circuit television system where digital imagery was transmitted from security cameras to a CCTV monitoring room situated in the venue security control room.

Critical Areas - Areas in an Olympic venues that were deemed to be critical from a security or operational perspective. These areas included VIP areas, broadcast compounds, power substations, spectator queuing areas, spectator seating, etc...

Critical Asset - Any asset or equipment that could not be removed, damaged or destroyed without significantly disrupting Olympic Games operations. (e.g. Olympic

³⁸ In the competition Olympic venues, the spectators M&Bs were open only during “on hours”, defined two or three hours before the commencement of the start of the competitions and two hours after the end of the competitions. During the “off Hours”, those hours outside the defined on hours period, competition Venues were cleaned (through the removal of waste) and restocked (through the movement in or out of new and needed equipment) for the next day of competition (or training).

³⁹ Regarding the principle that every person entering any Olympic venue had to go through security screenings, there were only a small number of exceptions, for example the international dignitaries with their escorts. Anyway, each person entering a venue, even an international dignitary, had to have its own Olympic accreditation card (or, if a spectator, a valid ticket).

venues' facilities, Olympic transport's facilities, communication facilities, Olympic infrastructure's facilities, etc...)

Explosives Detection Dog (EDD) - Highly trained dogs to respond to the presence of explosive materials or those substances that indicate the presence of explosives, during a security sweep or random search.

Field Of Play (FOP) - The area within a competition venue dedicated to carry out of competition and training.

Front of House (FOH) - The areas within the Olympic venue that could have been only accessed by the ticketed spectators or accredited persons.

Games Time - A period of time which started with the beginning of the Olympic opening ceremony and ended with the end of the Olympic closing ceremony.

Handheld Metal Detectors (Hand Wands) - A handheld, mobile device that alerted an operator to the presence of metal objects on a person when security screened.

Hard Ring - The hard ring of the venue was defined by a secure perimeter (that consisted of security fencing, security lighting, CCTV systems and security patrols) which provided a physical protective barrier around the venue's operational zones (called front of house & back of house).

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) - A constructed self made device, which contains explosive, pyrotechnics or incendiary chemical substances, intended to damage property and people. IEDs may be small (delivered by an individual) or large (delivered by a vehicle).

Integrated Security System (ISS) - The technical security systems that supported the detection and deterrence of adversaries' intrusions to the hard ring (clean and secure area). Those systems included: security lighting, CCTV system and intrusion alarm system.

Lock Down - Lock down was defined as being a state of security readiness when all security and access control measures were implemented and enforced by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel and by TOROC Staff. Security and access control measures included:

- Olympic accreditation cards and VAPPs control
- Security screening for pedestrians and vehicles
- Activation of the integrated security systems (CCTV, lighting and anti intrusion system)
- Start of the security patrols.

The venue had to be "*locked down*" before the start of the security sweep.

Mag and Bags (M&Bs) - Security screening of ticketed and accredited people through a combination of walk through metal detectors (mags), physical inspection and x-ray screening of personal items (bags or hand carried items).

Olympic Road Network (ORN) - The combination of designated Olympic roads used during the Olympic Games where priority of movement was given to TOROC authorized vehicles (vehicles with a valid VAPP) and public safety vehicles.

Olympic Venue Security Sweep Schedule (OVSSS) - A coordinated schedule (spreadsheet) that detailed the key operational dates (lock down and security sweep) and resource allocation for the conduct of venue security sweep by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

Prohibited Items - Prohibited items were those items determined by the legislation in force as being "*inherently dangerous*" and were therefore prohibited within Olympic venues hard rings. Prohibited items list had been defined by Italian Law Enforcement Agencies and included firearms, ammunition, other instruments defined by the law as weapons, explosives, chemical or incendiary devices.

Security Lighting - Lighting units/systems already existing or specifically installed to provide illumination for visual and CCTV surveillance of hard rings and security rings perimeters, designated critical areas and venue access points (M&Bs and VSAs).

Security Ring - The most inner security perimeter where all persons and vehicles were security screened (M&Bs and VSAs) prior to entering inside an Olympic venue (it only applied to two Olympic villages).

Security Screening - The security checking of persons and vehicles using special search methods and equipments (Mag&Bags, Hand Wands and X-Ray machines) to identify and locate prohibited items prior to entry into a clean venue hard ring.

Security Sweep - A security search conducted by specialist Italian Law Enforcement Agencies personnel, to ensure that all Olympic venues were free from any prohibited or hazardous items, that could have posed a threat to the security and safety of the venue and its occupants.

Soft Ring - The soft ring was an area, characterized by a non physical barrier, where only authorized vehicles with a valid Olympic VAPP were allowed to pass beyond a Vehicle Permit Checkpoint (VPC).

Turn Away Notice - A turn-away notice was an operational form issued at VPCs to vehicles which did not have valid VAPP's.

Urban Domain - A public space located outside a venue that was managed by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

Vehicle Exit Gate (VEG) - Allowed the exit of permitted vehicles from the venue, and restricted the entrance of all vehicles into the venue hard ring.

Vehicle Permit Checkpoint (VPC) - A "soft security" check point located on any designated Olympic access road leading into the venue where all vehicles VAPPs were checked by TOROC personnel in order to restrict any unauthorized vehicle from progressing into the venue soft ring.

Vehicle Screening Area (VSA) - The VSA was a designated area where all vehicles were security screened by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel to ensure that the vehicle and its occupants were free from prohibited items prior to enter the venue hard ring.

Venue Commander (VC) - A law enforcement officer who was responsible for the tasking and management of all law enforcement and public safety personnel and resources that are allocated to an Olympic venue.

Venue Emergency Response Plan (VERP) - A venue specific plan that detailed the roles and responsibilities of all TOROC staff in the event of a serious incident or an emergency within an Olympic venue.

Venue Security Control Room (VSCR) - The VSCR was TOROC Games Security command centre for the coordination and management of Games security operations within the venue. It was also the location of all monitoring equipment for the Integrated Security Systems (CCTV, alarms, etc...).

Venue Security Manager (VSM) - The venue security manager was the senior TOROC Games Security staff member at the venue who was responsible for the coordination and management of all TOROC Games Security staff, and the integration of Italian law enforcement agencies personnel.

Walk Through Metal Detectors (Mags) - A walk through pedestrian screening device that used magnetic characteristics to detect specific metallic items.

X-Ray Machines - An apparatus, fixed or portable, operated by Italian law enforcement agencies personnel, using low-level x-ray technology to detect and identify prohibited items.