With the support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security – related Risks Programme
European Commission – Directorate General Home Affairs

SMART CIBER –
System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events Rallies
Grant Agreement N. AG025
30-CE-0453363/00-22

CONCEPT PAPER
Integrated set of indicators lists: a synthetic risk assessment through an EU shared experience

by Alessia Ceresa[*] and Chiara Fonio[*]
(Scientific Team)

This paper focuses the attention on the "state of art" of the several EU Partners (Milan, Rotterdam, Budapest, Varna) involved in the project regarding the urban security aspect to achieve the final aim, i.e. the definition of a "risk-assessment model", shared among the several EU Big Cities.
To accomplish the research purpose, the starting-point is the gathering of the several experiences and expertise belonging to the different EU Municipalities involved in the project, to implement a model that is feasible for each urban specificity, i.e a flexible instrument that can adopt and adapt its capability of risk-assessment analysis to the different Counties and its related social, political, economical, cultural features.

29 June 2012

INTRODUCTION

The SMART CIBER study aims to implement a system of integrated risk maps (through a final software for the city governance), focalising the attention on the terrorism threat within the urban context, with a special interest for the complementary Critical Infrastructures and Big Events issues.

To achieve this goal, it is crucial to take into consideration the objective necessity in harmonising the *status quo*, i.e. the existing conditions, among the EU cities as partners in this project: Milan, Rotterdam, Budapest and Varna.

[*] Smart Ciber Project, Scientific Expert, PhD in Criminology
[*] Smart Ciber Project, Scientific Expert, PhD in Sociology

In light of this premise, it is *a priori*, fundamental to analyse the "risk assessment model" already existent in each city involved in, as the state of art on this issue and on the base of which to develop and improve the already existent systems.

It is possible to anticipate that the experience on the city governance of the four EU parents in the research are deeply different, as the city of Rotterdam has a great tradition in the management through a software which collects data on the vulnerabilities or emergencies and related events happened in this municipality. The city of Milan began to introduce a form of "organised" data gathering on the city vulnerabilities and related management and problem solving through a software, since the year 2008 (*Ambrogio Map*[1]) and tried to improve the system, although there is a peculiar situation, as at the moment, there are two different risk maps working in parallel, but never sharing information collected from the urban context. Instead the city of Budapest, which has a system (through a software as well) of data gathering from the territory of the different problems, is still at an early stage and it has to be improved and developed to optimise its existing resources and implement the model as well. Finally, the city of Varna never developed a system of risk map for the city governance, but there is a strong willing to create this kind of system also to adequate the safety and security policy to the average EU cities standard.
It is evident from this short profiling of the existent condition of each municipality involved in the project, how deeply different are the premises on the base of which each city starts to develop a "System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events", i.e. the research final aim.

1. THE MUNICIPALITY OF MILAN (ITALY)

The experience of Milan city is characterised for the use of two risk modes working in parallel, i.e. the s.c. "*Ambrogio Map*", managed by the PL-*Polizia Locale* (local police) and the s.c. "*Risk Map*" managed by the Municipality of Milan. In reality, the city public institutions reveal a gap in this system, because the two maps never "speak each other", i.e. the data gathered in each map are stored within its original context, as there is not an information sharing activity between the two experiences of city governance on the risk assessment and problem solving within the urban context.

[1] The *Ambrogio Map* has been tested for the very first time on 14 July 2008, only the Milan city District 4 (*Zona* 4) was involved in this experiment. In 2009 this system has been extended to all the 9 Districts (*zone*) within the Milan urban context, when 142 PDA were activated for the several local police agents who were used to patrol the different areas of the city

The limit of this experience is the waste of sensitive information from the urban context, as the stored data are visible only to the institution of reference (i.e PL or Municipality), but the lack of integration compromises an overall perspective of the city governance on the base of which developing the safety and security policies of Milan and related strategies.

In particular, the *Ambrogio Map* is characterised for an improvement of the technological level, implementing IT devices as facilitator factors for the management of Milan city.
The system in fact, is based on a central software able to collect the several vulnerabilities that the local police agents can record, store and take a photo with their PDA during their patrolling activity. The PDA contains a list of possible problems/criticises (i.e. the indicators list) that the PL agent can perceive during his/her everyday work.
The stream of data, gathered by all the PDA is stored and managed by a central software, where some operators can see each problem and coordinate the activities (inter-force cooperation) according to the specific nature of the event to solve the situation and recover it to the *status quo ante*.

The nature of the indicators listed in the PDA is deeply different: from a weak signal of social disease (e.g. abandoned area) to a proper illegal/criminal behaviour (e.g. prostitution, faked documents), considering also the urban structural problems (e.g. the lighting in the streets).

The aims of the *Ambrogio Map* can be synthesised as follow:

- it should become a crucial point of connection, where the most important information coming from the urban context should be centralised both from a security and safety viewpoint
- to rationalise the coordination activity to solve problems of different nature that a big city like Milan unavoidably may require
- it is a central channel of communication able to activate the subject/s in charge to solve a topic event, as well as to give a transparent and immediate feedback to the citizens when there is a problem to solve (whatever is the nature of this vulnerability)
- it should become an integrated system for a monitoring activity within the urban context and facilitate a consequent feedback analysis of the several problems and their related nature that need to be solved

The peculiarity of this system is that in the PDA has been uploaded a map of the city, so that an agent that records, gives a short description of the situation, takes a photo and stores a problem can indicate also the

specific and topic location of this event at the level of a single civic number of a building in Milan. The geolocalisation of the vulnerabilities in fact, allows the central software to reproduce and put a "flag" according to the level of emergency on the Milan city map, so that it is possible to have a clear (also from a visual perspective) overview of the several problems and related logistic locations in the different areas within the urban context.

On the other side, the Municipality of Milan-Urban Security Department (*Settore Sicurezza Urbana*) developed an other "*Risk Map*" on its vulnerabilities for a better governance of this city.
Also this further map is characterised for the use of technological devices and software to facilitate the gather of data coming from the territory. The aim is to understand fist, and then control the level of vulnerability and degradation of this urban context, both form a quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
Thereof, even the *Risk Map* of Milan adopted the system of using a list of indicators that, *a priori*, defines the several hypothesis of vulnerabilities present in the city.
Every 12 hours there is the update of the software, through a visual representation (i.e. gelocalisation) of the different (on going, solved or new) problems on the Milan city map.
The data are collected through different sources, i.e. the local police agents, local police headquarters of the several Districts (*Comandi di zona*), the citizens' information (also through call centres), etc.

From a technological perspective, this system is supported by an *ArcInfo* software for the data management and analysis by the Urban Security Department of the Milan Municipality plus the *ArcReader* for the database access to the local police headquarters of the several areas of Milan (totally 9 Districts). At the moment the PDA system to collect data has not been implemented, as there is a direct access to the local police database, although there is a limit, as the update of the system is slower, then through the use of PDA (like *Ambrogio Map*) where the update is quicker.

Although there are some technological differences in using the two systems, the indicators recognised as vulnerabilities by the two maps are almost the same, also from a qualitative perspective, as they are the phenomena and weak signals of the city that could represent the cradle where forms of radicalisation can develop (till the point of "extremism", where terrorism is the maximum expression): in fact, radicalisation not always leads to terrorism, but terrorism always grows up through a radicalisation process (inside and outside a person, inside and outside a group of people), given a certain space/time (see Concept Paper n. 1).

The objective sharing of the almost the same indicators (i.e. vulnerabilities) by the two maps is a crucial motivation in implementing a system based on the fusion of the *Ambrogio Map* and the *Risk Map*, to optimise the information and improve the inter-forces cooperation for a better prevention/repression policy development against any form of safety and security problems that could happen in a big urban city (see Appendix I).

2. THE SAFETY REGION OF ROTTERDAM (HOLLAND)

The Municipality of Rotterdam is the city that among the EU partners in this research has a consolidated tradition in safety and security policies, also addressed towards the terrorism threat.
The Holland in fact, is one of the EU Countries that developed specific studies on the radicalisation process as a phenomena that may (not always) leads to forms of terrorism or extremism in general within an urban and social context.
In particular, after the assassination of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh (2004), Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 2005 started the programme "Join in or get left behind" (MOA), according to which developing policies of prevention to improve an early detection of warning signals coming from the everyday life within a certain community, aimed to combat terrorism at an early stage both form a safety and security perspectives.
The three principles on the base of which this policy has been developed are as follow:
-**Prevention**
-**Preparedness**
-**Response**

It is evident how the strategy implemented covers the whole process from preventing potential threats to the response capability (repression activity) in case of an emergency occurs, through a program for increasing the awareness level both among the several sectors of the city governance involved in the safety and security activity and the citizens, as individual and community. The specific plan is based on a three phases activity (deradicalisation process):
-stimulating social cohesion
-making vulnerable groups more resilient
-identify, isolate and contain process of radicalisation

The result is an overall approach to the problem of social threats that can develop in topic vulnerable urban contexts.
In light of this premise, the Rotterdam City Council developed a risk map system, active both at a local level, as well as at national one based on indicators list of possible vulnerabilities, as weak signals that may reveal a social problem is arising: the Rotterdam Safety Index. The first one appeared in June 2002 and then the system has been progressively implemented.

The system aims in collecting both subjective and objective data:
-**subjective data** are gathered through a questionnaire provided to the local communities. It aims to understand the individual feelings of safety, problems that individuals experience as serious, whether a person has been victim of crime, etc.
-**objective data** are classified in two sub-groups, i.e. the first group is formed by the registration systems for the police, fire services, Roteb and other instances in which incidents, violations and crimes are registered; the second group of objective data is formed by the context information: physical, social and economical characteristics of the districts.

The nature of the indicators covers a wide variety of phenomena: form criminal/illegal behaviors (e.g. theft, burglary, vandalism, crimes related to drugs) to “disaster” categories (e.g. accidents with toxic material, accidents on water, accidents in a tunnel, fire in a large building, panic in a crowd). This kind of vulnerabilities in fact, are similar to both the *Ambrogio Map* and *Risk Map* of Milan city (see Appendix II).

The map is also characterized for a software able to collect the several data and geolocalise them through the division of the Rotterdam city within 10 Districts. The system is able to elaborate the data and give a feedback analysis of the situation through an objective and subjective score system, in relation to the crimes and vulnerabilities experience in this urban context.

Because of the similar approach between the Rotterdam city safety policy and the Milan city one, this project can give the opportunity to share competences, information and experiences to implement an already existent system belonging to some partners through the implementation of an harmonization process of the several policies and technological devices (software, risk maps, assessment systems) to reach a common standard among the EU Countries.

3. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BUDAPEST (HUNGARY)

The Municipality of Budapest has developed a risk assessment system much more based on vulnerabilities from a safety perspective, rather than the security one, similarly to the Municipality of Milan.
In fact, they have not a monitoring system *ad hoc* for security events, even focalising the attention on terrorism phenomenon.

In particular, the risk assessment policy is developed through a Risk Map similar to the *Ambrogio Map* and *Risk Map* of Milan, as it is based on a software developed through the implementation of an indicators list, which collect the most frequent vulnerabilities present within this urban context.
The quality of the indicators are also comparable to the ones of Milan, although there are some obvious specificities that belong exclusively to this Hungarian big city. The gap of the internal system is a reduced information sharing strategy that limits also the consequent resilience capability in case of emergency management. In fact, the internal structure of stakeholders involved in the safety aspect of the city are organised on the base of an hierarchical structure:
-**City Guards** (a sub-group of the local police): they depend on the Municipality
-**Local Police Agents**: they depend on the Municipality
-**Municipality Police**: they depend on the Municipality, but being in charge for the management of the security in case of terrorist attacks, when the national security is involved in, they depend on the Ministry of Internal Affaries (Prime Minister Office)
-**Secret Services**: they depend only on the Central Government

From a technological perspective, the agents in charge to collect data from the urban context on vulnerabilities, adopt a PDA device to record and store the information during their patrolling activity: an other system which can be compared to the Milan city one. Differently from Milan, instead, the central software that gathers the collected data is not developed enough to create a proper database able to make a risk assessment analysis, as well as a feedback report of the previous experiences in managing vulnerabilities; that is the main reason on the base of which there is not a statistical system available on this issue. In other words, the system is based on a day-by-day update of recording and solving problems: action/reaction principle.

Besides, the Municipality of Budapest has not yet implemented the EU Directives on the Critical Infrastructures protection against terrorism threat, therefore the Smart Ciber experience can be an

opportunity to develop also this aspect directly related to the urban context for a more effective governance of the city.

Therefore, to implement a common shared system of risk assessment, this study has analysed the indicators list in use in the Budapest Municipality on the base of which it has been developed a safety policy for the governance of the city. At the end of this procedure, some indicators have been selected, as they are more in line with the other EU big cities experience, to create a shared expertise of possible vulnerabilities set, testable in all the EU cities partners in this project (see Appendix III).

4. THE MUNICIPALITY OF VARNA (BULGARIA)

The Municipality of Varna has not developed specific technological devices or software addressed to the risk assessment for the city governance yet. In fact, the limit of its system is the high fragmentation of the data gathering, that leads to a fragmentation even of the ownership and accountability aspects of the data management. Therefore, there are different database working in parallel but never “speaking each other” (similar to the two risk maps of Milan), as the several data are transferred according to the topic owner/responsible for these data in different databases, the same situation follows the monitoring system aspect, as well as the control and enforcement procedures one.

Thereof, the Smart Ciber project should be intended as an opportunity for this city in analysing already existent and tested risk maps for the security and safety aspects of a big city, also in relation to the further topics of Critical Infrastructures and Big Events, as crucial components within an urban context.
The Municipality of Varna in fact, intends to analyse and share the experiences of the other EU cities partners in this study, to understand the best practices in this field and implement a system, the final software developed by the information sharing among the several municipalities involved in the project, as the output that the Municipality of Varna can adopt and adapt to the peculiarity of its own Country and urban features.

Finally, it is important to underline that the added value of the Smart Ciber project is the experiences sharing among some EU big cities, which contributes to improve the standard qualitative level of risk assessment capability for the governance of a city, where the Critical Infrastructures could represent privileged targets for terrorist attacks (see the cases of Madrid and London), as well as the case of Big Events, which are more and more “global” phenomena of different nature, not only sportive events, but

including any kind of event where a big flow of people takes part in, given a certain time and space: starting from the gathering of weak signals to have a clear perception of an urban context to better manage emergency events, such as terrorist attacks, where the radicalisation process plays a key-role, as the vulnerabilities (micro-criminality) represents the early stage of more dangerous phenomena (macro-criminality).

With the support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security – related Risks Programme
European Commission – Directorate General Home Affairs

SMART CIBER –
System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events Rallies
Grant Agreement N. AG025
30-CE-0453363/00-22

GLOSSARY

BIG CITY: it refers to a metropolis or a complex urban setting, characterized for a big flow of people living and/or working within a specific urban context.
BIG EVENT: Big Events of mega-events are "large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance".
CITY GOVERNANCE: it is the set of policies that the local government institutions adopts to rule the several activities that characterize a certain urban context, both from a single subject and social (group of people/community) perspectives. It defines the strategy according to which managing a city both to prevent/repress any form of vulnerabilities that can provoke a diffused social uneasiness.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: the EU Communication COM(2004) 702 defines Critical Infrastructures as "Those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of the government Member States".
INDICATORS LIST: it is a set of phenomena of different nature that *a priori* defines the several hypothesis of vulnerabilities present within a certain urban context. This phenomena may vary from the generic social uneasiness to specific forms of crimes.
RADICALIZATION THEORY: it is a theory according to which an individual can develop an inner process "through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is intent towards, or support for, violence".
It is important to underline that "radicalization" is not "terrorism", as the inner psychological process of radicalization not always leads to terrorism, while terrorism is always the result of a radicalization process.
RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL: a "model" is a schematic and simplified description of a phenomenon, system or process that accounts for its known or inferred proprieties and may be used for further study of its characteristics (i.e. predictions). Thereof, a "risk assessment model" is a scheme through which it is possible to analyse a set of phenomena that the experience indentifies as (quantitative and qualitative) highly probable to generate "risk" within a certain context.
RISK MAP: the "risk map" is a cartographic representation of the several vulnerabilities gathered from a certain urban setting. The added value is the fact that the several signals of social uneasiness and criminal phenomena are visually represented on the city map, so that it is possible to have a clear picture of the logistical location of the vulnerabilities. Besides, a cartographic system can facilitate the public institutions in implementing prevention/repression strategies against the most diffused criminal phenomena, as well as to reduce/control the vulnerabilities present in certain areas represented on the map system.

SAFETY AND SECURITY POLICY: the distinction between the two terms "safety" and "security" is always ambiguous, since in many languages there is not a concrete distinction between the two words, as there is only one word to express the both concepts (e.g. German '*Sicherheit*', French '*sécurité*', Italian '*sicurezza*', Spanish '*seguridad*', etc.). In reality the doctrine defines "safety" as 'the condition of being free form harm or risk', which is basically identical to the "security" definition, i.e. 'the quality or state of being free from danger'. But in the case of "security", a further meaning has been developing, more specifically in connection with criminological aspects, i.e. 'the measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack or escape'.
In light of the pervious premise, the "security and safety policy" is the set of rules and strategies to prevent/repress any form of danger, harm or risk , whatever is the nature of these phenomena.
TERRORISM: the doctrine has not given an exhaustive and clear definition of "terrorism". In fact, both the U.S.A. and the EU created their own "terrorism" definitions, although the result is for both definitions, a list of behaviours that the experience referrers to terrorism phenomenon.
The main difficulty in defining this complex criminal activity is due to its "dynamic and flexible" capability in adequate its violent strategy to the social, political, religious, historical context of reference. Thereof, the doctrine distinguishes different forms of "terrorism": i.e. religious terrorism, political terrorism, narco-terrorism, environmental terrorism, etc.; furthermore the logistic violent operative capability influences the "terrorism" definition: i.e. national terrorism and international terrorism.
VULNERABILITY: it is a certain phenomena that has negative consequences (social uneasiness) within a certain space (urban setting) from different viewpoints: i.e. social, political, institutional, economical, cultural, religious, etc.
WEAK SIGNAL: it is a phenomenon present in a certain setting, that apparently has not a negative consequences but in concrete it generates social uneasiness, also at the simple level of "social perception" (i.e. there is not a real and concrete risk, but there is a diffused sense of vulnerability within a certain community).

With the support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security – related Risks Programme
European Commission – Directorate General Home Affairs

SMART CIBER –
System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events Rallies
Grant Agreement N. AG025
30-CE-0453363/00-22

APPENDIX

Appendix I INDICATORS OF *MILAN "RISK MAP"*

The present list of Indicators is the one regularly utilized as Operative Protocol. It is the result of the fusion of two different "risk maps" and related indicators: the s.c. "*Ambrogio Map*" (managed by the PL-local police of Milan) and the s.c. "*Risk Map*" (managed by the Milan Municipality - Urban Security Department).

Abandoned area
Abandoned building
Abusive/Unauthorized camp
Hutment
Abandoned car
Unauthorized dump
Unauthorized occupation
Damages of different nature
Homeless
Acoustic pollution
Begging
Insufficient lighting
Lack of lighting
Street prostitution
Suspect attitudes
Seizure of public vehicles
Graffiti/Murales
Holes in the road or pavement
Damaged or removed traffic signs
Broken traffic-light
Slaughter
Murder
Infanticide
Blows
Physical injury

Failing to rescue
Brawl
Private violence
Threat
Sexual abuse
Sexual abuse against minors
Pornography with minors involvement
Stealing
Robbery
Extortion
Usury
Kidnapping
Damages against goods, animals, properties, etc.
Swindle
Receiving of stolen property
Sex trafficking
Obscene behaviors
Fraud in trade activities
Forgery of brands, documents, vehicles, etc.
Foods adulteration
Smuggling
Unauthorized vendors
Illegal sale
Crimes against the State
Crimes against the Public Administration
Violence and resistance against a public official
Terrorism activity
Organized crime
Mafia
Massage Centers and prostitution
Massage Centers
Pollution and environmental crimes

Driving under the effect of alcohol and drugs
Unauthorized occupation (building or apartment)
Clandestine immigration
Transgression of the security rules in labour context
Crimes against the C.d.S. (highway code)
Public activities security
Abusive building trade

With the support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security – related Risks Programme
European Commission – Directorate General Home Affairs

SMART CIBER –
System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events Rallies
Grant Agreement N. AG025
30-CE-0453363/00-22

Appendix II INDICATORS OF *ROTTERDAM "RISK MAP"*

The present list of Indicators is the one regularly utilized as Operative Protocol by the City of Rotterdam – Urban Security Department.

Radicalization
Abandoned building
Abusive camp
Failure of gas distribution network.
Abandoned car
Failure of sewage network.
Air pollution (dangerous goods)
Damages of different nature
Homelessness
Acoustic pollution
Begging
Insufficient lighting
Lack of lighting
Street prostitution
Suspect attitudes
Breakdown of transportation
Graffiti/Murals
Holes in the road or pavement
Damaged or removed traffic signs
Broken traffic-light
Manslaughter
Murder
Electrical black out
Blows
Physical injury

Failing to rescue
Brawl
Private violence
Threat
Sexual abuse
Sexual abuse against minors
Pornography with minors involvement
Stealing
Robbery
Extortion
Usury
Kidnapping
Damages against goods, animals, properties, etc.
Swindle
Receiving of stolen property
Sex trafficking
Obscene behaviours
Fraud in trade activities
Forgery of brands, documents, vehicles, etc.
Foods adulteration
Smuggling
Unauthorized vendors
Narcotics dealing
Crimes against the State
Crimes against the Public Administration
Violence and resistance against a public official
Terrorist activity
Organised crime
Mafia

ICT breakdown
Human trafficking
Pollution and environmental crimes
Driving under the effect of alcohol and drugs
Unauthorized occupation (building or apartment)
Clandestine immigration
Transgression of the safety rules in labour context
Crimes against the C.d.S. (highway code)
Public activities security
pollution drinkingwater
CBRNe risks
Panic in crowd during event

With the support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security – related Risks Programme
European Commission – Directorate General Home Affairs

SMART CIBER –
System of Maps Assessing Risk of Terrorism against Critical Infrastructures in Big Events Rallies
Grant Agreement N. AG025
30-CE-0453363/00-22

Appendix III INDICATORS OF BUDAPEST "*RISK MAP*"

The present list of Indicators is the result of the analysis of the official Operative Protocol regularly utilized by the City of Budapest.
The first list focuses the attention on the Indicators directly related to the topic of the present research:

Illegal waste disposal
Gas pipeline corrosion protection industrial object (damaged)
Graffiti
Other vandalism – public places
Electrical cabinets (damaged – open)
Automobile dismantling and assembly in public places
Public security situation in general + specific features of each area
Neglected plots of land, buildings
Unidentified or unknown origin materials, placed in public premises
Dangerous vehicle – with orange sign – parking in a residential area

The second list focuses the attention on the Indicators which can be generally classified as "Damages of different nature", indirectly related to the topic of the present research:

Road surface condition
Sidewalks condition
Public space surface condition
Public stairs condition
Handrails condition
Highway code table condition
Road signs
Traffic lights
Traffic slow down structures
Playground (fences, gates, pavement, sand, trash containers, built games)
Street furniture
Public sculptures, tables
Street names signs

Public fire hydrant (damaged – missing)
Public fire hydrant shut-off sign
Gas-pipe shut-off
Street lighting
Support structures for mobility impaired
Transformer station
Gas reception station
Wall and fence condition
Public transport stops, passengers waiting premises status (damaged)
Public toilets (damaged)
Water channel inlet opening (blocked – damaged)
Plaster, tile falling down
Icicles, heavy snow fall
Metal plating (damaged – missing)
Dog and other livestock problems
Designed areas for dogs (tables, fences, mowing: damaged – missing)