nel corso del primo semestre 2017 (ancora in corso), sono state censite 8 SIGACT che sono iniziate con l\u2019assalto al night club di Istanbul (gennaio) e si sono concluse (almeno per ora) con l\u2019attacco di Londra del 3 giugno scorso.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nTutto questo dovrebbe sorprenderci? La risposta dovrebbe essere negativa e la ragione puo\u2019 essere trovata in un duplice ordine di macro-fattori.<\/p>\n
Il Master Plan.<\/em><\/p>\nIl primo elemento di considerazione e\u2019 di natura organizzativa: occorre tornare al 2005 e rileggere la long term strategy<\/em> di AQ come delineata dal giornalista giordano Fouad Hussein nel suo libro \u201cAl-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda<\/em>\u201d. La fonte primaria utilizzata dal giordano sono state interviste e colloqui avuti, sin dalla fine degli anni \u201890, con alcuni tra i principali artefici della dottrina miliatante dell\u2019organizzazione jihadista globale: tra questi, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi – il capo del Tanzim Qaidat fi Bilad y Rafidayn (la organizzaizone di AQ nella Terra dei Due Fiumi) – e Seif al-Adl, ex Colonnello delle Forze Speciali egiziane e una tra le menti strategiche di AQ.<\/p>\nIn termini organzzativi, il master plan<\/em> delinato dagli strateghi di AQ puo\u2019 essere riassunto secondo le seguenti fasi:<\/p>\n\n- fase 1<\/em>: definita \u201cThe Awakening<\/em>\u201d, perido 2000-2003<\/em>, si riferisce al risveglio della nazione islamica da uno stato di ibernazione causata dalle catastrofi inflitte dall\u2019Occidente ai danni dei musulmani. Attraverso l\u2019attacco contro gli USA dell\u201911 settembre 2001 \u2013 indicato come la \u201ctesta del serpete\u201d \u2013 AQ, con tale provocazione, mirera\u2019 a generare una over-reazione del nemico: la fase termina con l\u2019invasione dell\u2019Iraq da parte US;<\/li>\n
- fase 2<\/em>: definita \u201cEye-Opening<\/em>\u201d, periodo 2003-2006<\/em>, vede l\u2019Iraq come principale terra di reclutamento per i soldati volenterosi a combattere gli USA. In questa fase, AQ dovra\u2019 evolvere da una struttura organizzata ad un \u201ctrend o movimento\u201d che sia condiviso dalla popolazione islamica. Il jihad condotto sul web propaghera\u2019 la visione e la ideologia di AQ, e verra\u2019 chiesto alla Umma di supportare finanziariamente il movimento al fine di compensare il sequestro di asset come conseguenza delle risoluzioni internazionali;<\/li>\n
- fase 3<\/em>: definita \u201cArising and Standing Up<\/em>,\u201d periodo 2007-2010<\/em>. AQ si concentrera\u2019 sulla Siria e Turchia, ma iniziera\u2019 a confrontarsi direttamente con Israele, al fine di guadagnare maggiore credibilita\u2019 da parte della Umma;<\/li>\n
- fase 4<\/em>: periodo 2010-2013<\/em>, AQ causera\u2019 la sconfitta dei governi arabi che portera\u2019 ad un consolidemenro della forza del movimento jihadista e ad un deterioramento della potenza economica statunitense attraverso l\u2019espansione del confronto;<\/li>\n
- fase 5<\/em>: periodo 2013-2016<\/em>, in questa fase il Califfato islamico verra\u2019 dichiarato, la potenza occidentale si disperdera\u2019 nella regione araba come conseguenza del suo coinvogemento nel conflitto contro il movimento; il balance<\/em> internazionale cambiera\u2019 ed il movimento attrarra\u2019, come alleati, nuove economie, come quella cinese, e l\u2019Europa iniziaera\u2019 a disunirsi;<\/li>\n
- fase 6<\/em>: definite \u201ctotal confrontation<\/em>\u201d, periodo 2016-2020<\/em>, lo Stato Islamico oramai stabilito formera\u2019 un\u2019Armata Islamica e provochera\u2019 una Guerra globale tra credenti e miscredenti: nelle parole del giordano, \u201cthe world will realize the meaning of real terrorism<\/em>\u201d;<\/li>\n
- fase 7<\/em>: entro il 2020<\/em>, la \u201cdefinitive victory<\/em>\u201d sara\u2019 ottenuta e con essa \u201cthe Islamic state will lead the human race once again to the shore of safety and the oasis of happiness<\/em>\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
La prassi operativa.<\/em><\/p>\nLa seconda ragione per la quale non ci dovremmo stupire e\u2019 sotto il profilo prettamente operativo.<\/p>\n
Il principale pensatore di riferimento e\u2019 Abu Musaab al-Suri, nome de guerre del muhajir jihadista Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, nato ad Aleppo e autore di una serie di testi dottrinali di riferimento sulla strategia e prassi operativa che il movimento militante dovrebbe adottare.<\/p>\n
Tra gli altri, al-Suri e\u2019 l\u2019autore del monumentale testo \u201cCall for a Global Islamic Resistance<\/em>\u201d, composto di quasi 1600 pagine, iniziato nel 2002 quando il siriano era in Iran e pubblicato sul web nel dicembre 2004.<\/p>\nDal punto di vista strategico, il teorico, dopo aver analizzato le cause delle sconfitte subite e degli errori commessi dal movimento nel corso di una revisione storica degli ingaggi passati, ha sviluppato una dottrina militante, definibile come \u201cnizam la tanzim<\/em>\u201d cioe\u2019 \u201csistema e non organizzazione<\/em>\u201d, che prevede l\u2019impiego di cellule locali autonome, per mezzo della massima dispersione operativa e decentramento logistico che e\u2019 attuato da piccole unita\u2019 auto-supportate ed ispirate alle linee ideologiche e programmatiche del movimento militante.<\/p>\nAl fine di fornire una dettagliata e fedele picture della teoria, di seguito vengono riportati alcuni estratti della traduzione inglese del testo di al-Suri:<\/p>\n
\n- \u201cour secret organizations<\/em> were militarily defeated in all the confrontations. Yes, we won many of the battles, but we lost the war in all the jihadi experiences and confrontations \u2026 Our secret organizations were defeated in terms of security, their cells were exposed and disbanded, and the attempts to build them were aborted. The security system of the enemy reached a level were even attempts to build cells were subjected to abortive strikes, before they were founded, or at their embryonic stage \u2026 The jihadi organizations also failed on the level of educating, preparing, and training their members for confrontation in the field of ideology, doctrine, program, security, as well as in the domain of politics and military expertise\u2026 except in limited cases. This was especially true after the start of the confrontations, because none of these secret organizations were able to complete the programs of preparation and building under the slogan ‘building through battle’, when the secrecy and the security conditions prevented that. In this way, the cadre and the supporters that had been formed through lengthy education were expended, and the level of education declined among the succeeding bases of cadre. This has happened in most of the experiences\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cif the methods of ‘the hierarchical, regional, secret organizations’ in confronting the local security regimes completely failed over the past decades, just imagine how much more we will fail in confronting the security apparatus of the New World Order, and the onset of the worldwide war to fight terrorism with all its security, military, ideological, political and economic means\u2026?! This is no longer possible. Rather, if we insist on using these methods under the current circumstances, it is \u2013 in my opinion \u2013 like committing suicide and insisting on failure \u2026 The times have changed, and we must design a method of confrontation<\/em>, which is in accordance with the standards of the present time. So, I repeat again\u2026 the main weakness is not in the structure of the secret organizations or their internal weaknesses, although they were underlying reasons. The main weakness is caused by the fundamental and revolutionary change of the times and the current premises, which has altered the course of history, the present, and consequently the future \u2026 we are able to summarize by saying that the experience on the Open Fronts<\/em> is regarded as a successful method of confrontation, when compared with the methods of the regional, hierarchical and secret organizations, which failed completely on all levels\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cspontaneous operations<\/em> performed by individuals and cells<\/em> here and there over the whole world,<\/em> without connection between them<\/em>, have put the local and international intelligence apparatus in a state of confusion, as arresting the members of aborted cells does not influence the operational activities of others who are not connected to them. I have made use of this observation, to a large extent, when shaping the desired operational concept of the cells of the \u201cGlobal Islamic Resistance Call\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cthe issue of individual jihad<\/em> was a great agitation success. It had great influence on awakening the spirit of jihad and resistance within the Islamic Nation, and it transformed unknown individuals \u2026 into becoming symbols of a nation<\/em>. The crowds cheer their names, people’s thirst for revenge is satisfied, and a generation of youth dedicated to the Resistance follow their example\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cit is no longer possible to operate by the methods of the old model, through the ‘secret regional- hierarchical’ organizations, especially after the September 11th events and the onset of the American campaigns, where the great majority of the existing secret organizations were destroyed, and the conditions made it impossible and futile to establish other secret organizations after this model \u2026 We need to concentrate the research on the methods of the open fronts<\/em>, and the methods of individual jihadi operational activity<\/em>, along with the methods of total resistance<\/em> in order to develop them, this in order to deduct a military and organizational theory<\/em> which is suitable for the coming period. This by using methods whose benefit has been established. And those two are; operational activity at the open fronts<\/em>, and secret resistance through individual jihad and small cells<\/em>. Before we discuss these two methods, however, it is appropriate for us to turn our attention to an important matter, and that is the necessity of planting the idea of globalizing jihad in all fields<\/em> \u2026 This is one of the axioms of the doctrine\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cin individual, secret jihad<\/em>, the operational activity also takes place on a global and universal horizon<\/em>. The horizons for this operational activity open up regardless of borders and countries<\/em> \u2026 But any Muslim, who wants to participate in jihad and the Resistance, can participate in this battle against America in his country, or anywhere, which is perhaps hundreds of times more effective than what he is able to do if he arrived at the open area of confrontation\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cthe jihad of individual or cell terrorism<\/em>, using the methods of urban or rural guerilla warfare<\/em>, is fundamental for exhausting the enemy and causing him to collapse and withdraw \u2026<\/em> The Open Front Jihad<\/em> is fundamental for seizing control over land in order to liberate it, and establish Islamic law \u2026 The Individual Terrorism Jihad<\/em> and guerilla warfare<\/em> conducted by small cells<\/em>, paves the way for the other kind, Open Front Jihad<\/em>, aids and supports it. Without confrontation in the field and seizure of land, however, a state will not emerge for us. And this is the strategic goal<\/em> for the Resistance project \u2026 That the basic axis of the Resistance’s military activity against America and her allies now, must lie within the framework of ‘light guerilla warfare’<\/em>, ‘civilian terror<\/em>‘ and secret methods<\/em>, especially on the level of individual operations and small Resistance Units completely and totally separated from each other<\/em>\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201chow to participate in the Resistance in Open Front Jihad: In most Arab and Islamic countries, with their current political divisions and entities, the preconditions for Open Fronts are not present. In most cases, they are arenas suitable for Individual Terrorism Jihad, small units, and secret guerilla warfare,<\/em> as a result of the dense presence of different American and allied interests, and of Western and Zionist hegemonic projects \u2026 Those mujahidin<\/em> who want to contribute in open confrontations, must<\/em> head for wherever the Fronts open up whenever they open<\/em>. They must operate under the field leadership’s command, as long as it fulfills the minimum criteria of being a legitimate banner and legitimate jihad under the slogan of universal Islam and as long as it is in accordance with the principles of the Resistance, its ideology and jihadi doctrine\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cterrorizing the enemies is a religious duty<\/em> \u2026 Allah has given clear orders in His book to terrorize His enemies \u2026 Yes, we are terrorists towards Allah’s enemies. We have already struck terror in them, and we have made them tremble in their holes, in spite of the hundreds of thousands of agents in their security agencies, and this happened after they terrorized the countries and mankind, and even put fear into the embryos in their mothers’ bellies\u201d;<\/li>\n
- \u201cmass slaughter of the populations<\/em> \u2026 is done by targeting human crowds in order to inflict maximum human losses<\/em>. This is very easy since there are numerous such targets<\/em>, such as crowded sports arenas, annual social events, large international exhibitions, crowded market-places, sky-scrapers, crowded buildings\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Successivamente ad al-Suri, altri importanti rappresentanti del movimento salafita jihadista globale hanno espresso la loro visione in tema di individualizzazione della prassi militante:<\/p>\n
\n- Abu Yahya Al-Libi ha spiegato il concetto di \u201cindividual jihad<\/em>\u201d come \u201ca single person or small group of mujahideen carry out a military operation according to the laws of the shari’a\u2026a one-man operation in the midst of the infidels’ territory may be much more effective \u2013 in terms of precision and choice of target \u2013 than dozens of operations on the battlefield<\/em>\u201d;<\/li>\n
- Anwar Al-Awlaki, in relazione all\u2019attacco condotto dal Maggiore Nidal Hasan a Fort Hood nel 2009, ha definito l\u2019azione come un modello per i seguaci della prassi militante di AQ operanti in occidente;<\/li>\n
- Attiyat Allah Al-Libi ha elogiato la tattica come una modalita\u2019 per penetrare i ranghi del nemico e come atto compiuto da un eroico individuo contro un nemico numeroso;<\/li>\n
- anche Adam Gadahn ha richiamato i seguaci di AQ nati in occidente ad abbracciare il jihad individuale e lanciare azioni nei loro paesi nativi.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
L\u2019iper-radicalizzazione e jihadizzazione da parte di singoli individui che agiscono riconoscendosi nell\u2019ideologia militante trova nelle piattaforme digitali la fonte da cui poter attingere linfa vitale: la nuova generazione di combattenti ha maggiori possibilita\u2019 di reclutamento, propaganda e pianificazione di quella della AQ 1.0, che trovava nei sermoni svolti nelle moschee o nelle videocassette provenienti dai teatri di jihad la fonte motivazionale o ideologica; ma anche di quella della generazione AQ 2.0, che si affidava a blog o forum \u2013 anche clandestini \u2013 per far circolare il messaggio propagandistico. L\u2019attuale generazione di jihadisti 3.0, sfruttando i vari social media presenti nelle moderne strutture di IT, sta ponendo in prassi la visione avanzata da Abu Musab al-Suri quasi un ventennio fa.<\/p>\n
Come riportato, i due macro-fattori consentono di ritenere che l\u2019attuale periodo sia da interpretare come l\u2019implementazione della visone strategica di lungo termine che la struttura globale del salafismo jihadista militante aveva delineato gia\u2019 agli inizi del 2000 per mezzo dell\u2019attuazione di prassi operative che spingono verso l\u2019isolazionismo dell\u2019azione militante, l\u2019opportunismo del target e dello strumento di combattimento.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L\u2019attacco di sabato sera 3 giugno 2017 e\u2019 l\u2019ultimo di una serie di eventi che, in maniera significativa dal 2015, hanno insanguinato il Vecchio Continente ad opera di individui (piu\u2019 o meno collegati a network strutturati)Read More…<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[29,264,147,216],"class_list":["post-3382","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-terrorism","tag-al-qaeda","tag-daesh","tag-lone-wolf","tag-terrorism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3382","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3382"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3382\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7154,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3382\/revisions\/7154"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3382"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3382"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3382"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}