{"id":4977,"date":"2019-10-30T18:39:50","date_gmt":"2019-10-30T17:39:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/?p=4977"},"modified":"2019-10-30T18:39:57","modified_gmt":"2019-10-30T17:39:57","slug":"the-legacy-of-the-caliph-opportunities-and-vulnerabilities-in-the-post-al-baghdadi-islamic-state-by-d-plebani","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/the-legacy-of-the-caliph-opportunities-and-vulnerabilities-in-the-post-al-baghdadi-islamic-state-by-d-plebani\/","title":{"rendered":"The legacy of the \u201ccaliph\u201d. Opportunities and vulnerabilities in the post al-Baghdadi Islamic State – by D. Plebani"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Continuity is essential in every organization, including terrorist groups. This principle seems to be crucial for Islamic State (IS), bound since its beginning to the idea of a \u201ccaliph\u201d according to its interpretation of the \u201cmethodology of prophethood\u201d[1]<\/a>. Given that both al-Baghdadi and IS\u2019 spokesperson al-Muhajir are supposedly dead, several questions arise: how the transition will be managed? Who will be the new \u201ccaliph\u201d and what challenges will he face? What are the overall consequences for the group? To gain a broader perspective it is imperative to analyse not just the \u201cperson\u201d al-Baghdadi but most of all its position as \u201ccaliph\u201d, as well as the fallouts of its demise over the group after its recent evolutions.<\/p>\n

The \u201ccaliph\u201d al-Baghdadi: \u201cemperor\u201d or \u201cshogun\u201d?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The actual authority of the \u201ccaliph\u201d over pragmatic decisions is debated. Forced to move continuously in several places, probably with limited contacts with its officers, it would be not out of place to wonder if al-Baghdadi have not become more a symbol than a commander. On the other hand, he played a role in all major IS\u2019 initiatives between 2018 and 2019. In a video message published on April 2019 he is showed while briefing its officials on the various wilayat<\/em> (provinces) of the \u201ccaliphate\u201d. A strong message, although maybe more based on propaganda than fact, especially in light of the recent episodes of growing internal opposition to its rule[2]<\/a>. Probably al-Baghdadi was able to exercise a more active role as commander during the early years of the \u201ccaliphate\u201d but later had to resort to a less direct approach due to security reasons.<\/p>\n

To compensate for the lack of a command and control chain<\/strong> all through the top, IS resorted to publishing broader guidelines<\/strong>: this way strategies like the \u201cwar of attrition\u201d and \u201ccampaigns\u201d such as the one to \u201cavenge the Sham\u201d emerged. IS\u2019 communication played a pivotal role in the matter, collecting under an umbrella of coherent narratives hundreds of attacks which otherwise would be just single initiatives. Such approach allowed and still allows IS\u2019 leadership to channel its operatives\u2019 efforts towards specific targets and methods without the need of constant orders.<\/p>\n

Succession: two opportunities for IS\u2019 enemies<\/strong><\/p>\n

The issue of succession regards both methodology and pragmaticism. To rise to the position of \u201ccaliph\u201d, IS demanded several requisites such as the relation to the Quraysh tribe[3]<\/a> and others detailed in the first issue of Dabiq magazine. This means that if on one hand it was possible for IS to trace al-Baghdadi\u2019s lineage to the tribe (which arise quite a lot of questions on its reliability), on the other such link could not be so simple for its successor. In other words, IS is finding itself trapped within its own pseudo-theology<\/strong>. Although it is possible for the organization to \u201cforge\u201d the lineage, this would expose its back to strong counter narratives by anti-IS forces as well as internal oppositions and other candidates. IS\u2019 \u201clegitimacy\u201d narrative is based on the correctness of their interpretation of religion. Therefore, if it is possible to prove or at least casting doubts on the requirements of a candidate, that would mine its authority and \u201clegitimacy\u201d over a group which encompasses a tapestry of organizations, each with their own agenda and characteristics and that find in the \u201ccaliph\u201d their only real junction<\/strong>. IS\u2019 second reorganization began<\/a> with a video message in April 2019: since then, all IS\u2019 wilayat pledged or renewed their allegiance more to the caliph than to the organization. An important detail which opens interesting chances (also on a \u201clegal\u201d perspective) for other candidates or secessionists as well as for counterterrorism. Tens of groups joined IS during its conquests but the current situation, with its \u201ccaliph\u201d dead and under pressure on all fronts, could reinforce centrifugal pushes<\/strong> and lead some groups to secession<\/a>. Moreover, if financial ties are severed along with the ideological junction, IS\u2019 competitors and adversaries could seize the opportunity to attack, make separate peace talks or incorporate some IS\u2019 formations. The reaction of al-Qaeda after the death of the \u201ccaliph\u201d will be fundamental<\/strong>, given the constant call by Ayman al-Zawahiri for unity[4]<\/a>. Considering these possibilities, IS could resort to a council with the aim of leading the group directly or until a suitable candidate is agreed upon. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Exploiting IS\u2019 vulnerabilities<\/strong><\/p>\n

The demise of IS\u2019 \u201ccaliph\u201d can still be managed by the organization. Having foresaw its defeat on the field, it is unlikely that its leadership and security apparatus \u2013 which for instance included<\/a> some former intelligence officers under Saddam Hussein \u2013 have not considered the killing of the \u201ccaliph\u201d. However, IS is strongly dependant on communication and the killing of the spokesperson al-Muhajir puts the group on a vulnerable position. Moreover Abu Ridwa, the \u201cvoice of IS\u201d in several major media products such as Flames of War I and II and the Harvest of the Soldiers series, has been captured in February. This means that if an official spokesperson would greatly facilitate the acceptance of a new ruler by the affiliates, this possibility for IS is precluded. It is no coincidence that several coup d\u2019\u00e9tat targeted communication channels and institutions: likewise, it is imperative to push forward and damaging IS\u2019 communication as much as possible in order to spread further confusion among the soldiers and wide the distance between them and their leadership.<\/p>\n

In conclusion, the killing of apical figures such as al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajir does not mean that the IS menace is ended but it provides favourable conditions to strike a formidable blow to the organization. Burrowing and expression taken from the chess game, what happened in the last few days is a \u201ccheck\u201d, not a \u201ccheckmate\u201d. The danger posed by IS is still present, both for what regards its present capability and its legacy. The legacy of al-Baghdadi<\/strong> will be probably used for propaganda and inspire new attacks: IS could turn this loss into a fire to reignite the embers of a group without a recognized leader, maybe by launching a new campaign. However, IS will have to manage it carefully in order to avoid casting a shadow over the future \u201ccaliph\u201d.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Methodology explained since the first issue of the magazine Dabiq in 2014.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Please see the excellent series by Aymenn Al-Tamimi at http:\/\/www.aymennjawad.org\/articles\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> The requirement is debated but enjoys wide consensus in the Sunni doctrine.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Given that al-Baghdadi has been killed in an area under al-Qaeda\u2019s influence, it is possible on the contrary that the relationship between the two groups could escalate into a wider conflict. Proper communication operations by the counterterrorism could facilitate such conflict and prevent the taking over by one of the group.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4974,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[430,264,87],"class_list":["post-4977","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-terrorism","tag-al-baghdadi","tag-daesh","tag-isis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4977","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4977"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4977\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4978,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4977\/revisions\/4978"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4974"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4977"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4977"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itstime.it\/w\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4977"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}