All posts by Marco Lombardi

Epilogo dell’orchestra: la PMC Wagner si ritira dal Mali – by A. Bolpagni ed E. Ristuccia

“Missione compiuta” o, meglio, “la PMC Wagner ha completato la sua missione in Mali”. Con queste parole, il 6 giugno, due tra i principali canali di propaganda dell’ecosistema Wagner su Telegram hanno annunciato (in contemporanea) con un video, seguito da un breve messaggio, la fine delle operazioni della PMC Wagner in Mali. Il messaggio è stato ripreso dal canale Telegram ufficiale degli Afrika Corps, che ha ribadito la propria presenza e l’impegno russo nel paese e nella regione. Dopo tre anni e mezzo, si conclude così una delle principali missioni della Wagner sul suolo africano, lasciando definitivamente spazio agli Afrika Corps, la PMC sotto il controllo del Cremlino formatasi dopo la ‘Marcia della Giustizia’ di Evgenij Prigozhin. Con l’istituzione degli Afrika Corps, Mosca ha infatti creato “un’organizzazione ombrello” che si ponga come alternativa alla Wagner e diventi la nuova principale proxy del Cremlino, incorporandone la struttura dal punto di vista logistico, politico-militare ed economico.

Facendo un passo indietro, alla fine del 2021, sfruttando il ritiro militare e diplomatico della Francia, il Cremlino ampliò sapientemente la sua influenza al cuore del Sahel, dispiegando un contingente del gruppo Wagner in sostegno alla giunta autoritaria del Mali guidata da A. Goïta. Seguendo il “modello Wagner” o “modello Prigozhin”,  la Wagner ricopriva ‘ufficialmente’ il ruolo di forza di controterrorismo contro Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslim (JNIM, o Gruppo di Sostegno e Supporto all’Islam e ai Musulmani – affiliata ad al-Qa‘ida) e lo Stato Islamico nella Provincia del Sahel (en, ISSP). ‘Ufficiosamente’, come avvenuto in altri paesi africani e mediorientali, agiva da ‘guardia pretoriana’ per il regime di Bamako.

Come si legge dal messaggio, la Wagner sottolinea come “l’orchestra ha combattuto spalla a spalla con il popolo del Mali contro il terrorismo.” Se, come dichiara la Wagner, “abbiamo ucciso migliaia di militanti e loro comandanti che hanno terrorizzato i civili per anni,” è pur vero che, tenendo conto dell’asimmetria militare ed economica tra Wagner/Mali e combattenti jihadisti, i mercenari russi hanno subito delle pesanti sconfitte nel paese saheliano. Prima fra tutte, l’imboscata subita nella battaglia di Tinzaouaten (regione di Kidal, Mali nord-occidentale al confine con l’Algeria) per mano di JNIM e delle milizie dell’alleanza Tuareg del Quadro Strategico per la Difesa del Popolo dell’Azawad (CSP-DPA). Con la morte di 80 mercenari russi (circa), si trattò della più grande sconfitta (conosciuta) subita da Mosca nel continente africano. Inoltre, a “terrorizzare i civili per anni,” è stata la Wagner stessa. Secondo quanto riportato da All Eyes On Wagner (AEOW), a un anno dal dispiegamento della Wagner in Mali, ci sono state diffuse segnalazioni di abusi e massacri nel paese. Come evidenziato da Human Rights Watch, le forze armate maliane e i combattenti della Wagner hanno ucciso e giustiziato sommariamente decine di civili durante operazioni di contro-insurrezione nelle regioni centrali e settentrionali del paese. Per esempio, nel mese di febbraio 2024, attacchi con droni militari nel corso di una cerimonia nuziale e di una sepoltura hanno provocato la morte di almeno 14 civili, di cui 4 bambini. In aggiunta, il fatto che sottolineino come “abbiamo aiutato patrioti locali a creare un forte e disciplinato esercito capace di difendere le loro terre” è ben lontano dalla realtà dei fatti. Tra gli inizi del 2022 e il 2025, secondo il Global Terrorism Index (GTI), seppur il numero medio di attacchi sia diminuito, il numero medio di morti è in aumento. Inoltre, i gruppi terroristici non erano mai riusciti a spingersi tanto in profondità verso la capitale Bamako. A settembre 2024, i militanti di JNIM riuscirono ad attaccare una caserma dell’esercito e l’aeroporto di Bamako, dando fuoco all’aereo presidenziale. L’attacco mostrò, da una parte, la profonda fragilità del sistema securitario maliano e, dall’altra, le crescenti capacità militari di JNIM, capace di commettere un attacco che solo qualche anno fa si credeva impensabile.

Il video che accompagna il messaggio si apre con una critica agli stati che, prima dell’arrivo della Russia, hanno “invaso” il paese e “sfruttato” le sue risorse naturali. La Russia, a differenza loro, è giunta come un alleato alla pari con il fine di sostenere la giunta maliana nella lotta al terrorismo, aiutando l’esercito di Bamako a ‘recuperare’ i territori sotto il controllo delle affiliate di AQ e IS. Mosca ha impiegato “le migliori armi” e le tecnologie più avanzate al fine di ristabilire la sicurezza nelle città maliane. Il video sottolinea il supporto fornito dalla Russia alle autorità locali per la riorganizzazione dell’esercito e la fornitura di equipaggiamenti militari. Poiché Mosca ha “adempiuto al suo compito”, è giunto il momento di “tornare a casa”. Sarà quindi opportuno porsi interrogativi sul fatto che questo ritiro ‘ufficiale’ della PMC Wagner rappresenti un’eccezione o sia la prima casella di un domino che porterà al definitivo ritiro della ex compagnia di Prigozhin dall’Africa, sancendo così l’ascesa degli Afrika Corps a principale proxy del Cremlino.

Mettendo da parte la dimensione propagandistica del video e del messaggio condivisi, è rilevante osservare come gli Afrika Corps stiano diventando sempre più protagonisti nel teatro africano quale principale moltiplicatore di influenzadel Cremlino. In principio, infatti, erano stati dispiegati in quei paesi dove la Wagner non ‘faceva da padrone’, mantenendo le insegne dell’ex orchestra di Prigozhin in quelli in cui la sua presenza ed influenza era ben radicata. La Russia era infatti restia ad abbandonare il cosiddetto ‘modello Wagner’, poiché smantellare completamente la PMC Wagner avrebbe privato il Cremlino delle infrastrutture e delle relazioni politiche, economiche e militari che hanno favorito la proiezione di Mosca nel continente africano. Tuttavia, gli Afrika Corps sono stati posti sotto il comando di uomini di stato – il Viceministro della Difesa Y. Yevkurov e il generale del GRU A. Averyanov – per consentire un controllo diretto del Cremlino ed evitare accentramenti di potere in figure come quella di Prigozhin. Sotto l’egida del Ministero della Difesa russo, gli Afrika Corps hanno infatti intrapreso un processo di sostituzione e ristrutturazione della presenza della Wagner nel continente africano. L’ufficializzazione del ritiro della Wagner dal Mali, inoltre, conferisce ancor più rilevanza al ruolo e alla statura degli Afrika Corps nella galassia (online e offline) delle PMC russe e, in senso lato, nel loro principale quadrante geografico d’azione, nonché l’Africa. Si articola così un ormai sancito ‘passaggio di consegne’ che aveva mosso i primi passi (ufficiosamente) con il dispiegamento degli Afrika Corps in nuovi, quali Niger e Chad, e vecchi teatri, ovvero la Libia, di intervento indiretto della Russia.

La presenza degli Afrika Corps in Mali delinea inoltre una rinnovata assertività del Cremlino in Africa, proprio ora che, dalla cosiddetta regione del Mediterraneo Allargato, Mosca potrà esercitare maggiore pressione sul fianco sud della NATO. Con la perdita (quasi definitiva) dello sbocco sul Mediterraneo Orientale dopo la caduta del regime di B. Assad, non è infatti un caso che il ritiro della Wagner dal Mali sia avvenuta in concomitanza con la volontà del Cremlino di installare sistemi missilistici nella base militare di Sebha, capoluogo del Fezzan controllato dal Generale K. Haftar, uomo forte vicino a Mosca. Se, da un lato, la Libia ha rappresentato e rappresenta il crocevia dell’espansione dell’influenza russa tra Mediterraneo, Medio Oriente e Sahel, il Mali (insieme a Niger, Chad e Sudan), dall’altro, rappresenta un avamposto strategico per proiettare l’influenza di Mosca nella parte occidentale della regione del Mediterraneo Allargato. In tale contesto, Bamako costituisce dunque una casella fondamentale nella scacchiera geopolitica russa in Africa. Si crea quindi un duplice vettore longitudinale della proiezione russa nel continente africano che passa dalla Libia al Sahel, con la finalità ultima di incrementare e consolidare l’influenza del Cremlino nell’intero continente africano e, in senso lato, una proiezione di potenza nella regione del Mediterraneo Allargato.

SPOTREP: Operation “Spiderweb”. A paradigm shift in modern warfare – by Emilio Palmieri

WHAT WE KNOW (SALT report)

Size. 117 first-person view (FPV) armed Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs).    

Activity. Complex and coordinated remotely controlled precision strikes against strategic and nuclear bombers aircrafts hosted in five major Russian air bases.  

Location. Russian Federation, cities of Belaya, Dyagilevo, Ivanovo Severny, Olenya, and Ukrainka (more than 4000 km of territorial reach).

Time. June 1st, 2025.

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). In the OSINT-sphere it has been reported that 41 aircrafts (the real number is still disputed though) were destroyed or disabled. Type of aircrafts targeted:

  • Tu-9: Soviet-era long-range strategic bomber equipped with turboprop engines capable of a max load up to 16 missiles, used by Russia to launch far-reaching h-55, Kh-555, and the newer Kh-101/102 cruise missiles;
  • Tu-22M3: supersonic long-range bomber of conventional and nuclear strike forces, capable of carrying Kh-22 cruise missiles;
  • A-50: AWACS-type aircraft used as C-4 (Command, Control, Communication, Computer) platform to detect air defense systems, coordinate missile strikes, and guide fighter aircraft. The loss severely limits Russia’s situational awareness and air command capabilities;
  • Tu-160: supersonic strategic bomber, capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional cruise missiles, including the Kh-101 and Kh-102, is a key component of Russia’s long-range strike and nuclear deterrent force.

The amount of estimated material damage is up to $7 billion in direct losses.

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW

Strategic level unknowns. In order to get a clear intelligence picture, at this time the following unknowns should be filled with the aim of understanding the operational posture of the Russian Federation as a consequence of the complex attack.

The first-level, time-essential information requirement to be fetched would be to gather, process and assess – with the aim of planning against – the kinetic intentions of Russia against Ukraine in the long-run[1].

A second-order information requirement may be the same type of reaction against a (Russian-deemed) enabler nation/s somehow involved in the Operation – like the US or others – that supposedly took part in the development and/or implementation of the decisive action. The goal would be to gauge Russian willingness of planning and executing a long-term retaliatory campaign, possibly thru proxies (in order to assure deniability) or by using active measures (assassinations, information/influence operations, sabotage, cyber ops), even linking up with other State-related adversaries (like China or Iran) by involving them in wreaking havoc in a persistent fashion.

A broader third-level information requirement – the “what if scenariomakes reference to the employment of multiple packs of armed drones on the part of China and Iran, both directly or thru proxy forces, against US and allied objectives. A possible indicator of the scenario might be referring to the swarms of drones that persistently loitered over identified portion of the US, specifically in close vicinity of military installations. The most concerning incident developed in December 2023 at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, whereas during the course of 17 nights, clusters of drones, likely off-the-shelf products, were observed flying over the base, which is home to some of America’s most advanced fighter jets, including the F-22 Raptor.

WHAT WE THINK

The Operation carries the features of a bot-based, stand-off positioned, direct-action type of special operation. However, this time around, the Ukrainian kinetic activity marks a paradigm shift in the conduct of modern warfare. The hybridity[2] of different tools combined and synchronized together that were employed to pull off the Operation can be deemed as the epitome of the evolving operational setting. Using a neologism, an assortment of ingredients were mixed up in order to serve the “soupfare of the day”, a kinetic broth targeting one of the most precious air assets in the hands of the Russian Federation. The necessity to disable, dismantle or destroy enemy air capabilities with the aim of degrading the “vertical dominance” in a conventional military confrontation is as old as the introduction of aircrafts in the battlefields: examples of such approaches can be gleaned in the Falklands or in the Gulf Wars. But here the difference is twofold: on the one hand, the “boom” executed by the Ukrainians is of unmanned origin. As for previous historical examples, Commandos of different sorts were infiltrated into the enemy terrain to conduct direct interdicting actions (with risks of mission failures and physical exposition of the force). On the other hand, for the Operation “Spiderweb”, as the name evocatively hints and due to the magnitude of the efforts, the planning process must have been time-consuming and must have involved a network of known and unknown (the latter greatly outnumbering the former) actors. For the previous kinetic actions, because of the limited extent of the engagement, a small but identifiable number of individuals, like commanders, operators, intelligence officers, were part of the planning and execution phases of the dismantling operations.

It is safe to assume that all of the phases of the operational process – planning, preparation, execution – were acted upon. Planning, with development of the enemy situation in order to analyze the center of gravity and then identify the critical vulnerabilities of the target. Preparation, with the lengthy process of getting the UAVs, concealed in delivery boxes boarded on contracted trucks, to the target area. Execution, with the launch of dispersed complex attacks aimed at producing massive damage with the effect of seeding strategic dilemmas.

The subsequent are first impression factors relating to the incident that might be highlighting the trajectory featuring a new phase of the constantly changing character of war:

Secrecy. Operation “Spiderweb” has underlying the sacredness of secrecy when developing and implementing a complex attack of this scale. The principal, which is a baseline assumption in operational planning and conduct, is more and more amplified in light of the strategic effects and magnitude of the kinetic decisive action. It is a ballet of information penetration activities by the Ukrainians against the Russians, and counter-penetration measures: a protractive blend of offensive and defensive counterintelligence undertakings. In the planning and preparation phase of the operation, the gathering[3] and processing[4] of intelligence information pertaining to the pattern of life of the targeted enemy system – basically the daily routine – must have been patiently developed in order to identify those critical vulnerabilities that were subsequently exploited, like the logistical scheme of maneuver of the trucks carrying the box, or attacked[5]. In the implementation phase, basically using the mythological Trojan Horse ruse, the Ukrainians were able to shape the operational environment in their favor and bring to successful completion the attack. 

Operation Security (OPSEC). Ancillary to the principle of secrecy, OPSEC is meant to be protecting “classified information such as physical security, information security, and personnel security in order to promote operational effectiveness by denying adversaries indicators of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions”. Similar to the Operation “Pager” carried out in September 2024 by the Israelis against members of the Lebanese Hizbollah[6] by weaponizing beeper devices, the Operation in argument is another embodiment of the practice of successful OPSEC, even in a target-countries like Russia that is gotten used to practicing strict control not only over citizens and activities, but also abroad – especially in Ukraine – thru the use of a reseau of informants.    

Swarming tactics. The tactical employment of UAVs in swarm formations is not a new approach in the military strategic thinking. Back in 2000, authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote “Swarming and the Future of Conflict”, wherein it was envisioned the “deployment of small, dispersed, networked maneuver units”. Even though the application of the concept was mainly focused on swarming of directed fires seeking devastating effects against the enemy in a conventional military confrontation, the authors slightly touched upon the usage of UAVs on the battlefield, at the time at the early stages of their operational employment. Anyhow, the concept still holds true: dispersed, networked, and interconnected clusters of drones that perform swarming attacks can achieve greater effects on enemy targets.

Strategic and psychological significance. If the reported DBA, both in terms of number and quality of targeted air assets, is confirmed, the outcome of the Operation has direct strategic effects in that it has severely crippled the kinetic air superiority of the Russian Federation. The decisive action is a typical example Effect-Based Operations (EBOs): the doctrinal evolution of the concept identifies EBOs as “operations conceived and planned in a systems (enemy) framework that considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects, which may—with different degrees of probability—be achieved by the application of military, diplomatic, psychological, and economic instruments”. As easily identifiable, Operation “Spiderweb” brings together all of the factors highlighted in the definition: the enemy system is the object of the complex attack; first, second and cascading effects on critically vulnerable components of the targeted enemy system are the desired impacts; different instruments of national power have been applied to achieve both the objective and the intended effects. Additionally and in the long-run, EBOs associated to the Operation could be generating second and third order effects also in the Russian cognitive and psychological domains: the results of the kinetic, dispersed engagements could be affecting the organizational and operational models of the Russian Armed Forces by means of raising dilemmas, distrust and disruption.

Relative Superiority. The Operation – which possesses the hallmarks to characterize it as a special operation[7] – has also demonstrated the application of the principles[8] – instrumental to get victory – in achieving relative superiority over the enemy, which is the “condition that exists when a smaller force gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well defended enemy”. The concept was firstly identified and disserted by Admiral (R) William McRaven, former SOCOM[9] Commander, in a thesis[10] that became a book in 1996 under the title “Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice”. The value of the concept of relative superiority lies in its ability to illustrate which positive forces influence the success of a mission and to show how the frictions of war affect the achievement of the goal. Once relative superiority is achieved, the attacking force is no longer at a disadvantage and has the initiative to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses and secure victory. Operation “Spiderweb” has proved how the Ukrainians applied the 6 principles over the course of the operation process in that they: developed a plan that, even if not linear, possessed a general simplicity in its essential design; as mentioned before, prepared the conduct of the plan by employing the utmost security (OPSEC) and repetition thru rehearsals; executed the deceive action thru the application of speed, surprise and purpose.

Implications. By exploiting initial lessons identified from the analysis of Operation “Spiderweb”, implications for Western Armies need to be fleshed out: they mostly refer to the relevancy of designing and developing a Counter-UAV (C-UAV) concept of operation (CONOPS) – which entails detecting, identifying, and neutralizing or disabling unauthorized or malicious UAV – along with a shift of the role of Electronic Warfare[11] (EW) as a supporting and ancillary effort to the C-UAV.

Strategic penetration. Another factor worth being highlighted is the strategic penetration that was achieve in executing the Operation. The wide territorial extent and the deep penetration of the UAVs assets once they reached the target areas mounted on the trucks and were liberated from the boxes in hot-spots that were deemed safe by Russia in light of the distance from their western flank, emphasize another aspect: the combination of AI into the flight systems which allowed UAVs to navigate by following the terrain, avoiding obstacles, and executing precision strikes with extreme accuracy but minimal human manning. AI-based target recognition, integrated with GPS navigation, adaptive flight correction systems and real-time image processing, enabled these UAVs to operate effectively even in heavily affected EW environments, like the ones in and around the Russian military bases. FPV drones were remotely controlled through Russian mobile telecommunications networks, including 4G and LTE connections: these networks provided sufficient bandwidth to support real-time video transmission and command inputs across vast distances, letting the Ukrainian drones evade the enemy defenses, both physical and electromagnetic, and execute the mission.


[1] Very recent news confirmed that Russia already reacted in a near-term fashion by launching a barrage of drones and ballistic missiles across Ukraine, specifically targeting the Capital

[2] By mixing a clandestine logistics chain, AI and GPS-guided technologies, swarming and disperse employment of UAV assets and mobile strike capability, Operation “Spiderweb” will be recognized as a change in traditional military doctrines based off linear, centralized, rigid and vertical command&control (C2) platforms.

[3] Thru Close-target Reconnaissance and other collection disciplines, first of all human intelligence (HUMINT) activities.

[4] By fusing in an organized manner the already gleaned data and information so that actionable intelligence can be disseminated.

[5] Phases entailed the smuggling of drones and launch equipment across the border. The payloads were hidden inside civilian-looking vehicles such as cargo trucks and mobile wooden homes that were strategically stationed near the bases and remotely open to let the UAVs fly outside and hit the selected targets.

[6] We delved into the Operation with the SPOTREP: The sabotage campaign in Lebanon. The weaponization of dual-use tools dated September 19th, 2024.

[7] A special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative

[8] Simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose.

[9] Special Operation Command is a unified combatant command within the US military responsible for coordinating and overseeing special operations forces.

[10] Dated 1993 when the Officer attended the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey.

[11] EW is a military action that utilizes electromagnetic energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum, attack an enemy, or impede their operations. It involves exploiting, disrupting, or interfering with electromagnetic signals like radio waves, radar, and infrared to gain information or neutralize enemy capabilities.

Le dinamiche del Terrorgram: propaganda, “santificazione” e violenza – by A. Pugnana e S. Lucini

Fin dalla sua nascita, il collettivo di estrema destra Terrorgram ha promosso l’accelerazionismo militante con l’obiettivo di portare al collasso la società moderna, considerata corrotta, per dar luogo a una rivoluzione suprematista bianca in cui il caos, la violenza e atti terroristici vengono utilizzati per consentire la creazione di un etno-stato bianco.

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“If you cannot win, change the rules”: Russian sabotage campaigns in Europe – by A. Bolpagni & E. Ristuccia

Since the outbreak of the so-called Russia’s ‘Special Operation’, Moscow has drastically increased sabotage operations on the European continent. Since the 2014 Crimean War, sabotage operations have been a trademark of the Glavnoje upravlenije General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GRU), namely Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

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10Apr/25

L’omicidio di Alessandro Coatti, il ricercatore italiano ucciso e smembrato in Colombia- Cosa sappiamo fino adesso – by Giovanni Giacalone

Risulta al momento ancora avvolto nel mistero il movente del brutale omicidio del ricercatore italiano Alessandro Coatti, il cui corpo è stato smembrato e i resti ritrovati pochi giorni fa in tre diversi luoghi di Santa Marta, città della costa nord della Colombia.

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04Feb/25

Understanding Salafi-Jihadi Communication: Insights from Mujahid Mind AI – by Ali Fisher

The Nature of Salafi-Jihadi Communication: Salafi-Jihadi groups communicate based on deeply rooted theological principles. Their messaging has remained consistent over time, as evidenced by materials produced before and after major global events, such as the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq that enabled the rise of AQ.

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27Gen/25

La paradossale fascinazione per il suprematismo bianco: il caso Solomon Henderson – A. Pugnana, S. Lucini e A. Bolpagni

Il 22 gennaio 2025, il diciassettenne Solomon Sahmad Charlie Henderson ha commesso uno school shooting alla Antioch High School di Nashville, Tennessee (USA). Alle 11.09, Henderson è entrato nella mensa scolastica dell’edificio scolastico e ha aperto il fuoco, ferendo un compagno e uccidendo una studentessa per poi togliersi la vita.

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18Gen/25

From Data to Division 5 of 5: Artificial intelligence – by Daniele M. Barone

The Half-Measure of Human-Grounded AI Ethics. Within the context outlined thus far, as argued by Coeckelbergh and Sætra, the debate carried on by LLMs ongoing development seems to be between two main point of view: the Marxist concept of “technological determinism” and the “technological instrumentalism” or “technical orthodoxy”.

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