Since the outbreak of the so-called Russia’s ‘Special Operation’, Moscow has drastically increased sabotage operations on the European continent. Since the 2014 Crimean War, sabotage operations have been a trademark of the Glavnoje upravlenije General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GRU), namely Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
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Mentre gli occhi del mondo sono concentrati sulla guerra in Ucraina e sul conflitto tra Israele e Hamas, la Russia sta riconsolidando la propria presenza in Libia, ponendo un’ulteriore minaccia al fianco sud della NATO. Nonostante la disfatta dell’alleato Generale K. Haftar nella battaglia di Tripoli nel 2020, la presenza russa è rimasta ben consolidata in relazione al più ampio progetto geopolitico di proiezione di potenza nel Sahel e nell’Africa sub-Sahariana.
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Since February 2024, at least ten operations between arson attacks and train sabotage have been planned, several of which have been intercepted by the intelligence services of the countries targeted. Where operations were successful, pictures and related videos were disseminated on PMC Wagner’s main Telegram channels. Such acts of sabotage do not constitute an isolated case, but rather part of a broader operation.
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Dalla fine di febbraio 2024, dopo un silenzio durato sei mesi, i vertici della Wagner hanno riavviato il processo di reclutamento per le operazioni in Africa e ad aprile 2024 Afrique Media, ha annunciato l’arrivo degli Afrika Corps in Niger.
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Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on 23 August, PMC Wagner continued to operate in the African and Middle Eastern theatre, except for the troops that were engaged in Ukraine and are now stationed in Belarus. In recent months, however, the Ministry of Defence has undertaken a plan to restructure the PMC Wagner network, preserving its tactical-operational assets and the benefits derived.
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After the March of Justice, announced on June 23, the evolution of the relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and PMC Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin was discussed at length. On August 23, exactly two months later, one of the private jets on which Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, considered his right hand, were traveling crashed en route between Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, PMC Wagner exploited online and offline support of some military groups, including:
All these units were orbiting around the PMC Wagner as embedded support groups. Starting from their online propaganda we theorized a pro-Wagner alliance system (figure 1).
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Guerra cibernetica e guerra russo-ucraina: la disinformazione.
Conferenza on line il 16 marzo 2023 ore 10:00 con la partecipazione del Generale Alexander Potity del SSSCIP-State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine e Head of the Department of Security of Information Systems and Technologies. Place: MS Teams platform: https://tiny.pl/wkbg5 Continue reading
Se la guerra ibrida è caratterizzata dalla molteplicità degli attori sul campo, lo schieramento in Ucraina supera ogni precedente storia. Continue reading
Questa riflessione non vuole assolutamente essere l’inizio di una “battaglia” intellettuale o una risposta polemica al recente articolo dell’ex-senatore Luigi Manconi, autore di un pezzo pubblicato sul Corriere della Sera, dal titolo “Perché la resistenza armata è etica”, l’8 marzo scorso. Continue reading
La Guerra Ibrida: più volte ho commentato questa definizione del conflitto, sostenendo – non da solo! – che si trattasse di una evoluzione del modo di fare la guerra, caratterizzata da: Continue reading
