A quarter of a century has passed since the 11 September 2001 attacks, providing an opportunity to view the commemoration from a European perspective and with a critical approach. 9/11 gave terrorism a different social presence and changed security practices, transforming, in many ways, aspects of people’s everyday lives.

European countries already had considerable prior experience of various forms of terrorism, mainly separatist and far-left, with groups like the IRA, ETA, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, November 17, etc. What changed, though, after September 11 was that the focus shifted to jihadist terrorists, and terrorism became a central organising principle of European security policy. So, this is an opportunity to ask some difficult but necessary questions regarding the security policy that followed 9/11 in Europe:

i. Can democracies compromise the rule of law in order to defend themselves?

9/11 was perceived as an attack not just against the U.S. as a country, but against Western values and democracy in general. Countering terrorism was supposed to defend the Western world and its principles against those seeking to destroy them. Some of the U.S. practices developed during what was called the “War on Terror” seriously compromised those principles, for example Guantánamo, detention without trial (sometimes secret and indefinite), torture during interrogation (the infamous “enhanced interrogation practices”), expanded surveillance powers, etc. The EU approach did not go so far as to directly normalise torture. However, European states became implicated in CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programs, with the European Court of Human Rights finding Convention violations in cases involving secret CIA detention facilities and transfers on European territory, e.g. concerning Lithuania. Additionally, criticism of the EU counter-terrorism strategy could also focus on how far preventive security interfered with rights. The clearest example  was the expansion of data collection and surveillance: telecommunications data retention and, later, Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems, subjecting very large numbers of ordinary people to the collection, retention and automated analysis of their data, before the Court of Justice of the European Union decisions pushing back.

ii. How successful was the “War on Terror” for Europe?

The response to 9/11 took the form of a global “War on Terror”. Apart from the human consequences (direct and indirect deaths, as well as population displacement), the most important issue has been how military interventions produced fertile ground for more terrorist threats to emerge. State structures collapsed, sectarian conflict intensified, and armed networks emerged, creating new opportunities for terrorist violence. Alongside destroying terrorist group capacity, military interventions generated grievances, created political vacuums, traumatised communities and fostered powerful narratives that encouraged terrorism. European states participated in both the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and European forces later participated in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS and jihadist organisations in the Sahel. The risk of European countries being attacked by terrorists as a consequence of these wars increased. It should be noted, though, that there was never an “EU War on Terror” approach, and countering terrorism was not considered a military issue, but one requiring civilian, police and judicial handling.

iii. Is jihadist terrorism the most dangerous?

The Hamburg cell had an important role in 9/11, so there was reason for Europe to be vigilant about jihadist terrorism very early on. Unfortunately, this led to European Muslim communities been viewed as containing potential terrorists, thus requiring observation and intervention. The stereotype of the “Muslim terrorist” shouting “Allahu Akbar” influenced political rhetoric, media representations, policing and threat perceptions. Islamic religious identity began to be treated as a security risk, and Muslims became victims of discrimination and hate crime. The consequences affected counter-terrorism itself, resulting to an analytical security problem. The security apparatus in Europe, as well as in the U.S., failed to recognise and respond in a timely manner to other sources of terrorism and extremist violence. Jihadist terrorism remains a very dangerous form of terrorism in Europe, yet European terrorism landscape has always very diverse. Inadequate attention was given to many of the security threats that developed into what we have to deal with now: right-wing and accelerationist violence, anti-government extremism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist violence, hybrid and nihilistic forms of violent extremism.

iv. What does the concept of “radicalisation” really mean?

Few concepts demonstrate the post-9/11 European counter-terrorism approach better than “radicalisation”, which describes the process through which individuals or groups develop radical beliefs. In terrorism studies, the more specific expression “radicalisation to violence” is used to show how the process leads to the acceptance and, ultimately, use of violence. Strategies, networks, projects, conferences, training programmes, prison interventions, educational initiatives, municipal programmes, etc. have been built around the term. Academics, governmental and professional actors have been trying to identify how people “radicalise”, prevent radicalisation, detect indicators of radicalisation and eventually “deradicalise” individuals. An entire security field has emerged around preventing and countering radicalisation. Yet, the conceptual problems of the term remain. Radical ideas alone do not lead to terrorist violence, since people can hold radical political or religious beliefs without ever becoming violent. Furthermore, what is considered radical can be quite subjective. Historically, certain ideas once regarded as radical or even dangerous led to social progress and have today become accepted political and societal principles, e.g. women’s emancipation, racial equality, etc. Moreover, research has not demonstrated any uniform or linear pathways to terrorism. Radicalisation does not provide a causal explanation, especially when countless individuals holding radical beliefs do not cross the threshold from ideas to terrorist action. That, of course, does not mean that research on pathways to terrorism is useless. It means, though, that we need to continue searching for causal explanations and not use the word “radicalisation” where we should be looking for further explanations about why terrorist violence was chosen by the perpetrator.

v. Is counter-terrorism a lucrative business?

9/11 dramatically expanded the security market. Sophisticated surveillance technologies, biometrics, databases, border-security systems, online monitoring, risk-assessment tools, cybersecurity products and an extensive private-security sector became part of the economy of fear. Additionally, an expert ecosystem emerged: consultants, institutes, training programmes, conferences, projects, certifications, etc. Expertise is obviously necessary, and serious terrorism research requires specialist knowledge. But precisely because security attracts funding, visibility and political attention, critical scrutiny becomes essential regarding who is an expert, what expertise means and how useful is a particular research. Much of the work carried out is excellent and necessary, yet sometimes familiar concepts are just repackaged, and it is doubtful whether all projects demonstrating their success through conferences, reports, etc. are indeed contributing to the prevention of terrorist violence. More than two decades after September 11, the question is not whether we have terrorism experts, projects and reports in Europe, but how much genuinely new knowledge is generated that leads to interventions that actually work.

European countries have unquestionably developed better ways to investigate and respond to terrorism after 9/11. Intelligence, police and judicial cooperation is stronger, while aviation and critical infrastructure are protected in more sophisticated ways. Victims of terrorism have also acquired visibility within European policy. A critical perspective should acknowledge those achievements and, at the same time, question the consequences of the response to terrorism. For example: What has been the cost in rights, freedoms and social cohesion? Do expert knowledge and research really explain terrorist violence and improve prevention? We should ask not only whether new technologies and security practices are possible, but whether they are necessary, proportionate and effective. Twenty-five years after September 11, we should not only be looking at the threats we prevent, but also at the kind of society we build while trying to prevent them.