ITSTIME speeches at the VOX-Pol online seminar “Under the Radar: Understanding the Salafi-Jihadi terrorist online information ecosystem” (Part 2)

On December 3, our analysts Alessandro Bolpagni, Eleonora Ristuccia, and Grazia Ludovica Giardini took part in the online seminar organised by VOX-Pol. This online seminar examined the structure and evolution of the contemporary Salafi-jihadi terrorist information ecosystem. It will focus on how violent extremist organisations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, exploit mainstream social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram. The seminar will explore the scale of activity carried out by “media mujahideen” within these environments and analyse the strategies they use to enhance the resonance of their messaging among target audiences. In addition, speakers addressed the role of Ansar media and unaffiliated supporters in conducting media jihad on behalf of these groups. Special attention will be given to explaining the continued presence of Salafi-jihadi actors on mainstream platforms, including the evasive tactics they commonly employ, believing it helps them to bypass content moderation.

In this presentation, they delved into the most important social networks of the Salafi-Jihadi online ecosystem, namely Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. When it comes to addressing Salafi-Jihadi propaganda presence on those platforms, we are used to hearing that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have been driven off these social networks. However, the reality tells another story. Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok present a heavy presence of Salafi-Jihadi material. Moreover, the most concerning thing is that this content is present in its most recognisable forms. Moreover, by recalling Abu Saad al-Amili’s words, although these social networks have been considered online spaces where Salafi-Jihadi groups are mere guests, nowadays the situation seems to change. In fact, the authors observed how users are gradually settling on the digital frontier of the Salafi-Jihadi online ecosystem, sharing more complex and articulated material, going beyond most known propaganda material. For this reason, they have noticed the emergence of a horizontal propaganda stream between Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Specifically, each of these platforms has its own content, based on how it works. The authors focused on what a user can do by simply swiping according to the platform’s functioning. On Facebook, a highly textual platform, users are “forced” to go into the posts’ texts and comments. On Instagram, instead, users tend to swipe from right to left, to go through images and videos carousel and, above all, through their followings’ stories. Finally, TikTok, which pushes its users to scroll almost only down through its For You page’s videos (Figure 1).

Based on this concept, we are dealing with different platforms, usual content, but in multiple forms. The authors observed the presence of different types of materials on these platforms (Figure 2). Except for the ‘Gaming-Jihad propaganda’, all these typologies can be present on Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok.

The social networks on the digital frontier share a number of techniques exploited by the Salafi-Jihadi movement to disseminate propaganda material. These include the use of the comments section, Direct Messages (DMs), stories, re-posts, broadcast channels, group chats, live propaganda discussions, ‘Account Hijacking’, hashtags, ‘Photo Mode’, editing and filters, and ‘favourites’ section. Nonetheless, they are used in different ways depending on the social network.

Firstly, Facebook is a highly ‘textual’ social network (Figure 3). This can be inferred from the fact that the character limit for post captions is 63,206. Hence, users are able to share large portions of text within the comments section and interact in a more extensive way. The comments section is used both to share propaganda content and spread links or outlinks to other platforms. Then, hashtags are employed as a functional tool for categorising Salafi-Jihadi content. Finally, Facebook is used by Salafi-Jihadi groups as a content aggregator, collecting several links and outlinks and directing users to pages operating on other platforms.

Secondly, Instagram is a sort of ‘in-between’ social network between Facebook and TikTok, being focused on both textual and visual content. Salafi-Jihadi groups are exploiting Instagram by means of broadcast channels and group chats (Figure 4), where they share institutional, Ansar Production, non-institutional, and non-branded propaganda content. Salafi-jihadi groups also use Instagram stories not only to share propaganda content, but also to disseminate outlinks which lead users to more encrypted platforms (e.g., Telegram and Element). Highlights are also exploited to categorise propaganda material. Moreover, carousel posts are employed to store propaganda in a single post. This is the case, for instance, with entire issues of An-Naba or a series of bulletins by Amaq News Agency.

Within TikTok, users are allowed to create their own content by means of exploiting the editing features directly provided by the platform itself. Therefore, TikTok combines the edit-custom experience with the sharing one, allowing the proliferation of a highly creative type of content. In this respect, it was possible to detect a particular type of pro-Salafi-Jihadi propaganda, namely non-branded propaganda (Figure 5). The latter refers to a typology of pro-IS propaganda material which is not directly related to the institutional, non-institutional, and Ansar Production media outlets. Differently, this type of content is characterised by the use of audiovisual elements directly attributable to the Salafi-Jihadi imagery appeal to the audience. Notwithstanding the fact that the non-branded propaganda can be easily found on the other mentioned social network platforms, the latter assumes a particular connotation within TikTok, due to the platform’s high-level editing features. Consequently, it is possible to identify a whole section of highly edited non-branded propaganda, using elements and/or filters not related to IS. Differently, it was noticed that the employment of several elements, which are particularly appreciated by the younger audience. Other non-branded propaganda has been produced and shared by means of TikTok itself. In this case, it is possible to notice the combination of high levels of editing with the adaptation of pro-IS images to the most popular mainstream trends on TikTok. This leads to the creation and further dissemination of a controversial type of content, often crossing the so-called ‘hala-haram line’.

By means of monitoring how pro-Salafi-Jihadi propaganda is shared within the TikTok environment, it can be said that jihadi supporters take advantage of all the features provided by the platforms in order to accomplish their communicative purpose in terms of propaganda stream. Particularly, some TikTok users were seen to exploit the TikTok live streams in order to share Salafi-Jihadi propaganda and discuss it, creating a sort of safe interactional space within the platform. Furthermore, content is shared in two different indirect ways. On one hand, some users have been using the ‘Repost’ section in order to indirectly share Salafi-Jihadi propaganda, which was previously disseminated by other users on the platforms. On the other hand, the so-called ‘favourite’ section began to be used by TikTok pro-Salafi-Jihadi users. By means of using this particular TikTok feature, Salafi-Jihadi supporters are able to create and organise efficient folders of propaganda content, making it easier for new potential sympathisers and supporters to reach the content thanks to this ‘silent repost’.

To conclude, we stress the concept that each platform, which has its own audience, shows specific content shared by Salafi-Jihadi groups’ supporters through the exploitation of the platform’s features (Figure 6). According to that, we must highlight that Salafi-Jihadi groups’ supporters behave as normal human beings, who use these social networks according to their functioning. In other words, propaganda material on Facebook is highly textual because Facebook focuses on connecting people through people. Propaganda on Instagram is centred around visual and textual content because Instagram connects people and content. Finally, TikTok, where propaganda content is completely articulated on audiovisual content, because TikTok connects users only through content.