From January 2025 to October 2025, G. L. Giardini and A. Bolpagni have been monitoring and analysing the presence of the pro-Islamic State (IS) ecosystem on TikTok, especially focusing on the dissemination of IS propaganda within the social network platform. Through day-by-day monitoring using Digital Human Intelligence (Digital HUMINT) techniques, more than 270 seed accounts have been identified. The latter, which are pro-IS accounts actively sharing propaganda material, have been functional to the reconstruction of a network characterised by more than 100,000 users. 

Focusing on the type of propagandistic content shared and the way in which the material is disseminated by the targeted TikTok accounts, it was possible to outline a categorisation of the users part of the pro-IS ecosystem on the platform itself. Specifically, the content analysis led to the identification of 15 pro-IS user categories, of which 7 ‘pure’ and 8 considered to be ‘mixed’ categories. The ‘pure’ categories are characterised by pro-IS accounts dedicated – mostly or totally – to the dissemination of one type of pro-IS propaganda, namely Institutional, Ansar Production, non-Institutional, non-branded, theological, or ‘Gaming-jihad’ content. The last ‘pure’ category – Re-poster accounts – has been identified by means of considering those users who did not share pro-IS content directly on their personal accounts, but rather reposted propaganda material from other existing pro-IS TikTok accounts. Differently, the ‘mixed’ categories are composed of users dedicated to the dissemination of at least two types of propaganda content in ‘equal measure’. 

Furthermore, it can be said that TikTok occupies a significant role in what Ali Fisher theorised as the digital frontier. The latter section of the pro-IS online ecosystem constitutes the most superficial layer of it, where content is ‘openly’ and ‘directly’ accessible thanks to social network platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Discord, and TikTok. Specifically, TikTok became one of the platforms of choice within the Digital frontier, due to its peculiar features and ‘addictive’ nature, especially towards younger individuals.

Therefore, TikTok reconfirms itself as both an efficient and functional exit point of the IS propaganda and entry point for the pro-IS online ecosystem. On one hand, TikTok represent an effective exit point for the dissemination of pro-IS propaganda material coming from the most encrypted social media platforms operating in the core of the pro-IS online ecosystem. On the other hand, TikTok can also be considered a functional entry point for new potential pro-IS supporters and sympathisers. By means of disseminating the content directly on the mentioned platform, new sympathisers have the chance to get familiar with the pro-IS propaganda content, facilitating the radicalisation processes and the progressive shift to platforms operating in the core of the pro-IS ecosystem. Finally, it is also necessary to underline that TikTok does not only encompass the role of a ‘digital recruitment platform’ but rather a functional space where digital da‘wa – proselytism – can be conducted. 

In conclusion, given the significant degree of young individuals operating on TikTok and the functional features of the latter in terms of creation, editing, and dissemination of audiovisual content, it is crucial to pay attention to the potential role of TikTok in recruitment and consequent radicalisation processes of young individuals. Its popularity among young individuals has thus made TikTok a ‘platform of choice’ for IS.